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ABSTRACT 
It has long been known that humans display a number of cognitive biases when they are 
asked to select from a series of possible choice alternatives in economic decision-making 
tasks. In stark contrast however, the last two decades of research on sensorimotor control 
have shown that humans are able to exhibit statistically optimal behaviours (i.e. select the 
most appropriate action from a repertoire of options) when they act on the environment. 
Given that many critical decisions in the real world require not only selection but also 
action, it is surprising that there has been little crosstalk between these areas of research. 
This thesis bridges this gap in the literature by introducing a new experimental framework 
that allows the manipulation of features related to action selection and execution to 
understand how these processes interact to manifest in decision-making. Specifically, a 
novel multi-trial decision-making task is developed where participants are asked to select 
from a series of options with varying levels of risk and reward (equivalent to choice 
selection in economic decision-making) and implement their choices with actions that 
place demands on the sensorimotor system. One particularly prevalent bias in the 
decision-making literature is risk aversion under uncertainty, but recent studies have 
shown that this phenomenon can be reversed when the task is reframed as a sensorimotor 
reaching task. This thesis examines this bias in detail by experimentally manipulating key 
component parts in choice selection and action execution. There is a particular focus on 
the role of agency, feedback (either veridical or predetermined), motor competence and 
learning. Visual execution error has consistenly resulted in riskier behaviour as well as 
better error correction. Together, this work demonstrates the interplay between cognitive 
and sensorimotor systems in choice selection by illustrating the bilateral relationship 
between parameters driving action selection and execution interact to produce decision-
making. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
1.1 Research on Decision-Making 
Decisions are the building blocks of life. Given the frequency with which we all make 
decisions and thus, the intuitive familiarity we have with the process of decision-making, 
it is no surprise that this topic has been the focus of intense research for over 100 years. 
Indeed, the psychological examination of decision-making behaviour has resulted in three 
Nobel prize winning research programmes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1955; 
Thaler, 2000). Yet, at the same time, given how diverse decisions can be- ranging from 
the very mundane (e.g. should I take the motorway or the backroads to work today?) to 
the life-changing (e.g. should I move to a different country to undertake doctoral 
training?), it is no surprise then, that many parts of our understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying decision-making remain incomplete.  
 
At its most fundamental level, we can think of separating decision-making into two 
component parts: (i) making a choice, and then (ii) acting upon that choice (Rasmussen, 
1993). In the scientific literature, we refer to an action selection component – a process 
that involves value processing and determines which choice must or should be made (e.g. 
“I need to go and get some milk from the shop”) and a second action execution component 
that implements the selected choice and interacts with the world around us (e.g. the 
physical act of going to the shop to get milk; Orasanu & Conolly, 1993). 
 
The majority of research on the psychology of decision-making has been inspired by an 
economic perspective. The aforementioned Nobel prizes were awarded for their 
psychological contributions to economics (and ultimately have resulted in the creation of 
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a whole new discipline of behavioural economics). These types of research programmes 
ask questions that probe the factors that influence choice selection (Hensher & Johnson, 
2018; Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2015; Shafto & Bonawitzx, 2015). In keeping with 
our earlier example, why choose to go for milk over orange juice?  What brand of milk 
might you purchase? Does your appetite for a particular choice change as a function of 
experiencing that choice? What about the impact of previously experienced “rewards” for 
choosing an alternative? The questions are myriad, but a common feature of all of this 
type of questioning is that the key neural architecture responsible for making these 
decisions is principally housed in the prefrontal cortex and the domain of “higher order” 
cognition (Evans, 2008; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Phillips, Fletcher, 
Marks, & Hine, 2016).  
 
Imagine now that you did indeed follow through with your decision to go to the shop and 
buy a bottle of milk. You arrive home and desire to make a cup of tea. A series of 
decisions need to be implemented to achieve this goal. Yet, we do not muse over the 
possible trajectories that one could take to reach towards the milk bottle and then select 
the optimal one (Wolpert, 1997), nor are we explicitly aware of the amount of force 
needed to apply with our hands to ensure the bottle does not slip through (Seidler & 
Stelmach, 1995; Wolpert, 1997). The processes involved in making these types of 
decisions and enacting upon them has principally been the domain of sensorimotor 
learning research (Held & Freedman, 1963; Shadmehr, Smith, & Krakauer, 2010; 
Wolpert, 1997). These types of questions have often focussed, explicitly or implicitly, on 
the role of the sensorimotor system - a network of neural structures which include all the 
afferent and efferent connections and the central architecture involved in integrating 
information and processing to produce movement (Riemann & Lephart, 2002). The 
cerebellum and basal ganglia are thought to be the key players here in the modulation and 
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regulation of sensorimotor commands (Ghez, 1991; Riemann & Lephart, 2002) - and 
thus, the focus has almost exclusively been on the action execution elements of decision-
making. While historically, many have refrained from labelling such investigations as 
decision-making per se, a number of prominent researchers have started to emphasise the 
need for motor execution to be understood as decision-making (Wolpert & Landy, 2012).  
 
Given the obvious relationship between these component parts, it is striking to note that 
research into these two broad areas has largely developed independently, with little 
overlap or cross referencing to one another. In short, historically, researchers have either 
examined the cognitive processes involved in action selection or the sensorimotor 
processes that produce action execution.  
1.2 An Alternative Take on Choice Selection 
There has been a growing recognition of the symbiotic relationship between sensorimotor 
and cognitive systems.  At its broadest level, and a hypothesis that ventures into the realms 
of philosophy, has been the theory of embodied cognition. This is the idea that cognition 
is a product of a symbiotic relationship between brain body and environment (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). In line with this world view, and more specific to decision-making, are 
emerging reports demonstrating pathways between the cerebellum and areas implicated 
in higher order selection (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001; Imamizu & Kawato, 2009), 
which present a neuroanatomical gateway for interactions between cognitive and 
sensorimotor systems to manifest.  
 
Predicated on these ideas that higher order cognition and the sensorimotor system may be 
more closely intertwined than previous investigations have indicated (Wilson, 2002), this 
thesis sets out to bridge a highly pertinent gap in the field and sets the scene for a new 
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perspective on decision-making. This thesis considers action selection and execution as 
more equal players in behaviour than previous work has implicitly acknowledged. 
Specifically, the work reported in this thesis involves developing a new experimental 
framework that allows the manipulation of features related to action selection and 
execution to understand how these features interact to manifest in decision-making.  
 
Given that this work falls at the intersection of sensorimotor control and behavioural 
economics, this general introduction chapter will refrain from providing a historical 
overview of each independent area and their most influential theories; these subject 
matters are too vast to do justice in one single thesis. Instead, the following sections 
present a few select core concepts that are most relevant to the integration of choice 
selection with action execution. The introduction also covers some descriptions of key 
studies that have helped shape this nascent area and we will refer to these ideas throughout 
the thesis as they relate to the experiments reported in subsequent chapters. 
1.2.1 A Brief Overview of Economic Choice Selection 
Any examination of decision-making must, as a matter of course, consider Expected 
Value, Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
Expected Utility is now often presented as a highly critiqued model of how humans make 
choices. In short, it proposes that when presented with options, an agent will calculate the 
probability and magnitude and a multiplication of these variables will lead to “expected 
value”, or EV, of the choice; and rational choice selection is then simply the process of 
selecting the option that yields the highest EV (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, 
& Schultz, 2009; Devlin, 2008). 
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Seminal evidence subsequently emerged showing that individuals often violate these 
assumptions of EV and thus, deviate from rationality. Take for example, a situation where 
you must choose between two different lotteries: in one option, buying a ticket is known 
to result in a 50% chance of winning £3000; whilst a second option guarantees the award 
of £1000. The first option has the higher expected value (E = p.X; 1500, 1000, 
respectively), but it is a matter of empirical observation that the vast majority of people 
presented with the type of scenario posed here would prefer the second option and take 
the sure-fire £1000.  
 
It is also the case that when posed with these scenarios, context is an important factor. 
For example, risk appetite may vary as a function of current wealth. The options 
considered above may be quite different if one already has a few million pounds in the 
bank. This is the fundamental basis of Expected Utility Theory (EU), formed by Neumann 
& Morgenstern (1947). Whilst EV might be thought of as an objective value of outcomes, 
EU considers the role of subjective evaluation of outcomes and seems to better fit the 
economic decisions of individuals (Schultz et al., 2008). 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1974) emphasises the importance of two 
variables in decision making. First, it proposes that ‘losses loom larger than gains’- that 
is, people are prone to overweighting the influence of a potential loss relative to the 
equivalent expected reward (see Figure 1.1A). The second is that people will 
systematically underweight both high probability and low probability events (see Figure 
1.1B).  
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Figure 1.1 Value and Probabilities According to Prospect Theory (A) When people 
lose, the value is over-emphasised compared to gains. When people gain, the value is actually 
diminished by more gain. (B) People appear to round up probabilities close to both 1 and 0 and 
as a result, over-estimate small probabilities and underestimate large probabilities e.g. an event 
with 80% probability may be treated much lower.   
 
Following Knight (1921), there has been a key distinction in the decision-making 
literature between action selection that takes place “under risk” and action selection that 
takes place “under uncertainty”. In the former, potential consequences (both 
advantageous and disadvantageous elements) of the different options are known by the 
decision-making agent. An example of risk is rolling a pair of dice. The odds are known 
for each possible outcome (provided that the dice are fair) before rolling.   
 
In contrast, decision-making under uncertainty has ambiguous or unknown outcomes. 
The two decision-making contexts are marked by different choice profiles (Brand, 
Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006) with a plethora of empirical studies showing people are 
more willing to gamble under risk, where the probabilities are known, in comparison to 
uncertainty (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 1961; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Camerer, 2005).  
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A famous example to illustrate these differences is the Ellsberg paradox. Imagine a 
situation where there are two decks which each contain 20 cards. One of the decks 
comprises 10 yellow and 10 green cards (a “risky” deck) and the second deck has 20 
yellow or green cards where the composition of yellow and green cards are unknown (an 
“uncertainty” deck). The game requires a bet on a colour. If the drawn card is the chosen 
colour, a player will win a fixed amount and nothing otherwise. In these types of 
environments, people seem to prefer to gamble on picking a yellow card from the risky 
deck rather than the uncertain deck and gambling on green follows the same trend.  
 
In theory, the subjective probability of yellow in the uncertain deck is seen to be lower 
than the subjective probability of yellow in the risky deck and same trend for green; 
however, the probabilities of yellow and green from the uncertain deck must equal 1. This 
is the root of the paradox (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Ellsberg, 1961; Hsu et al., 2005), and 
highlights the importance that the absence of information can play on choice selection 
(Fox & Tversky, 1995; Frisch & Baron, 1988).  
 
Uncertainty and risk have also shown to have distinct neural correlates (Brand, Recknor, 
Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007). In decision making under uncertainty activation in the 
orbitofrontal cortex is heightened- a structure which is central to the perception of reward 
and punishment feedback, including anticipation and receipt of feedback. Alongside this, 
the amygdala also exhibits heightened activity- the amygdala responds to the motivational 
value of incoming information and the processing of a “vigilance”/ evaluation system 
(Clark & Manes, 2004; Hsu et al., 2005; Mushtaq, Bland, & Schaefer, 2011; Rolls, 2000; 
Uytun, 2018), In contrast, decision-making under risk seems to relate to the dorsolateral 
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part of the prefrontal cortex which is primarily implicated in cognitive processing e.g. 
feedback evaluation and working memory (Brand et al., 2006; Clark & Manes, 2004; Hsu 
et al., 2005; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000). 
1.2.2 Sensorimotor Decision-making 
At the turn of the 21st Century, a group of researchers based primarily in New York 
University set about examining whether the types of decision-making biases illustrated 
by prospect theory might also manifest in the sensorimotor system (Trommershäuser, 
Maloney, & Landy, 2008). Their approach was to take classic economic choice tasks and 
provide analogues for the sensorimotor system. The most fundamental form of this task 
presents participants with two circles intersected on a computer screen (Figure 1.2). One 
of the circles is a “reward” circle, where the magnitude of reward increases from the edge 
to the centre. The other circle is a “penalty” circle. Participants are asked to collect as 
many points as they can by tapping the reward circle (under time constraints) and 
understand that the closer to the middle of the circle they are, the more points they gain. 
They must however trade this potential reward off with the possibility that as they aim 
for the middle of the target, they stand more chance of erroneously hitting the overlapping 
penalty circle and risk losing points. By changing the degree of overlap, risk and reward 
can be manipulated in a mathematically equivalent way to asking participants to select 
options in classic cognitive economic choice tasks.  
 
A decade-long programme of research using this type of motor decision-making task 
(Gepshtein, Seydell, & Trommershäuser, 2007; Neyedli & Welsh, 2013, 2014, 2015; 
Trommershäuser, Gepshtein, Maloney, Landy, & Banks, 2005; Trommershäuser, Landy, 
& Maloney, 2006; Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2003b, 2003a; Trommershäuser 
et al., 2008), gave rise to the idea that the processes governing sensorimotor decision-
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making were in stark contrast those governing the cognitive decision-making: They were 
“optimal” and devoid of the biases that are so obviously apparent in cognitive decision-
making and thus not well explained by prospect theory.  
 
Figure 1.2 A Sensorimotor Decision Making Under Risk Task.  Participants are asked 
to tap anywhere in a green circle on a computer screen on within a time restriction. The green 
circle is the reward circle. Tapping anywhere on the screen corresponds to a lottery but the centre 
has more reward than the edge of the green circle. The red circle is the punishment circle where 
participants lose point by tapping. There are numerous versions of this task where the location of 
the circles, the distance of between circles and time constraints of execution (tapping) have been 
manipulated. This figure is reproduced based on Trommershäuser et al. (2008). 
 
The researchers came to this conclusion following their application of Bayesian Decision 
Theory to their data. Bayesian Decision Theory (Savage, 1954; known as founder of 
modern Bayesian decision theory), as the name indicates, is rooted in Bayes Theorem – 
a centuries old formula that has only recently had the commensurate computational power 
required for it to be feasibly implemented in real-world situations (Edwards, Lindman, & 
Savage, 1963).  
 
Bayes theorem deals with making inferences about the probability of an event given 
another event- i.e. it deals with conditional probabilities (see Equation 1): 
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Equation 1 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴).  𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
 
 
Conditional probabilities have three components and can be explained with the following 
example; you are at work and suddenly feel restless. Your friend at work was sick with 
flu last week. Does it mean that you have flu, too? You sneeze and have a fever and you 
know that people with flu sneeze and have a fever 90% of the time. You turn to google 
and learn that only 5% of population will catch the flu in the current year and that 20% 
population in the current year sneeze and have a fever. What do you think the probability 
of you having flu is, given these symptoms?  
 
Bayes theorem helps us update our hypothesis based on new observations. Your 
hypothesis is that you have the flu and your observation is that you have the symptoms. 
You have two additional pieces of information that would help you more precisely 
estimate the probability of having the flu given your symptoms.  
 
When you use Equation 1, P(A) is the probability of you having flu (0.05), which is 
referred to as the prior probability; P(B|A) is the probability of symptoms given that you 
have flu (0.9), known as the observation; and P(B) is the probability of you having the 
symptoms (0.2), which is referred to as the likelihood probability.  
 
Now using the equation, you can calculate the posterior probability of you having flu 
given that you have the symptoms (0.225). Using Bayes theorem, the posterior probability 
( 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) ) can be estimated by using the conditional probability ( 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ), prior 
probability (𝑃(𝐴)) and likelihood probability of the event (𝑃(𝐵)).   
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Bayesian decision theory extends this approach and includes a Maximisation Expected 
Gain (MEG) parameter (Trommershäuser et al., 2003a) (see Equation 2 ):  
 
Equation 2 Γ(S) = ∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑃(𝑅|𝑆) + 𝐺𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑃(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡|𝑆) +  𝜆𝐵
𝑁
𝑖=0
(𝑆) 
 
Here, Γ(S) stands for expected gain through making a decision which is a sum of gain 
( 𝐺𝑖, 𝐺𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡)  from two possible outcomes according to their probabilities ( 𝑃(𝑅|𝑆) 
and𝑃(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑡|𝑆)), and the biomechanical cost (𝜆𝐵(𝑆)) required by each movement. 
The possibilities are calculated following Bayes Rule (Equation 1).  
 
Through the implementation of Bayesian Decision theory, these researchers were able to 
calculate the optimal behaviours to maximize gain and minimise losses and empirically 
observed that tasks framed as sensorimotor in nature showed participants could maximise 
expected gain and minimise expected loss. 
 
According to Bayesian theory, when the distribution of prior probabilities is weak or 
uninformative, posterior probabilities will be more heavily driven by observations, 
whereas, strong prior probabilities will drive estimations of posteriors (Edwards et al., 
1963).  Importantly, the priors are updated as events occur; therefore, it is fair to say that 
every former posterior will give rise to a stronger estimation of prior probability for the 
next estimation (Edwards et al., 1963). If one event (outcome or set of outcomes) is 
12 
 
 
experienced more than another event, the posterior probabilities of the first event will be 
stronger (Steyvers, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2009).  
1.2.3 Agency and Decision-making 
What is the purpose of decision making? Whether we come from a sensorimotor or 
cognitive perspective to this question, at its most fundamental level, we make decisions 
in order to act on and change the environment around us. It is this ability to be able to act 
that gives us agency (Bandura, 1982; Friston et al., 2013; Gallagher, 2000; Haggard & 
Chambon, 2012a). 
 
Whilst the topic of agency has often transitioned into the domains of philosophy and law, 
in psychology, in psychological experiments agency has often been operationalised 
through  initiating or triggering an action (Haggard, 2017) and closely related to action 
preparation driven by the primary motor cortex  (Passingham & Wise, 2012). 
 
Researchers often make a distinction between the three component parts of the agency 
construct: there is: (i) the feeling of agency; (ii) the judgement of agency; and (iii) the 
ownership of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). The feeling of agency relates 
to the experiential feeling of being the agent, whilst judgment of agency relates to the 
experience of being the agent (e.g. feeling of ownership) (Jeunet, N’Kaoua, & Lotte, 
2016; Synofzik et al., 2008). The feeling of agency can be considered independent from 
any verbalisation; rather it is supposed to be based on the signals from action execution, 
whereas, judgment of agency is when an individual has to judge whether a movement is 
their own (David, Stenzel, Schneider, & Engel, 2011; Farrer & Frith, 2002). Finally, an 
ownership of agency relates to the ability to be able to accurately classify whether one’s 
13 
 
 
own body is moving (whether under voluntary or involuntary control) (Haggard, 2017; 
Synofzik et al., 2008).  
 
There are primarily two ways of measuring sense of agency in the literature: explicit and 
implicit approaches. Explicit approaches involve asking an individual if they are in 
control of what they are doing (Haggard, 2017). Even though this measure seems direct 
and quite straightforward, there are a number of reported limitations to measuring sense 
of agency in this manner. Human biases in outcome evaluation and inference on causality 
lead to the assignment of agency to unrelated events (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). For 
example, people report that they are in control of an outcome, when they successfully 
predict a chance outcome (Langer & Roth, 1975) and these biases are even stronger in 
situations regarding positive outcomes  (Bandura, 1982). An example of this is a study 
where participants are asked to direct a moving dot by pressing keys on a keyboard. 
Participants are required to move the dot from one point to another. In one condition 
participants are in control of the movement of the dot and in the other, the task is designed 
to omit the erroneous commands of participants while moving the dot. Then the 
participants report how much control they have had on moving the dot after each trial by 
using 9-point scale; they reported higher sense of agency on positive outcomes when in 
actual fact the erroneous comment was ignored. In other words, participants’ sense of 
agency escalates with positive outcomes and better execution feedback (Wen, Yamashita, 
& Asama, 2015).  
 
An implicit approach to measuring is more likely to reflect the lived everyday experience 
of agency- for we do not often have third parties asking us about our role in the causation 
of an event in any explicit way (Haggard, 2017; Synofzik et al., 2008). The implicit 
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measures are interval of action-outcome (intentional binding) as well as actual degree of 
control (Berberian, Sarrazin, Le Blaye, & Haggard, 2012; Haggard, 2017). Intentional 
binding is described as the perception of the interval between a voluntary action and an 
outcome, which is shorter than the perception of the interval between similar involuntary 
movement and same outcome event (Berberian et al., 2012; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 
2002).   
 
Rather surprising are analyses showing little correlation between explicit and implicit 
measurements of agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Haggard, 2017) suggesting that they 
tap into fundamentally different component parts of the construct of agency. There is now 
a growing consensus that if one wants to tap into the feeling of agency, then this should 
be measured implicitly to avoid contamination from biases arising from the judgement of 
agency (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014). 
1.2.3.1 Manipulating Agency 
Key to investigations into the underlying nature of agency are manipulations of the 
construct through experimental tasks. The classic approach in experimental psychology 
to dissociate agency comes from asking participants to carry out actions on a computer 
versus showing the participant a computer carrying out the same task without any input 
from the user. 
 
One notable and elaborate manipulation of this type comes from Berberian and colleagues 
(2012). These researchers asked participants to complete a simulated task mimicking the 
role of an air traffic controller, in which they needed to safely navigate an aircraft through 
a flight path and provide real-time solutions to any problems that might arise over the 
course of the flight. Each trial involved a sequence of 5 steps.  
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Shortly after the start of a trial in which participants were supervising a flight, a conflict 
(in the form of another aircraft in the path) emerged. At this point, the participants had to 
indicate that they had detected the conflict by applying a red circle around the intruding 
aircraft. Following this, a course of action had to be determined (the action selection 
phase- how should I best divert the aircraft away from the supervised flight path?). 
Subsequently, the participant needed to implement the decision through the use of a scroll 
wheel, indicating a new trajectory for the intruding aircraft (an action implementation 
phase) and finally, participants executed the implemented decision by pressing an 
engagement button. After a controlled temporal delay, feedback relating to the success of 
the action engaged was provided to participants indicating whether the problem had been 
successfully resolved or not.  
 
Crucially, this separation of the phases of action selection, implementation and execution 
allowed the researchers to systematically vary the amount of control a participant had 
over the task. In every different block, one of these steps was taken away and 
implemented by a computer. At the end of every trial, participants were asked to report 
their estimates of the temporal delay between the action and the result (Figure 1.3) as well 
as the subjective report of how much they felt in control while navigating the aircraft after 
each block. This study provided some evidence that action outcome interval was strongly 
related to the subjective report of level of sense of agency which was dependent on actual 
action-effect interval.  
 
16 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Experimental task examining agency.  The task requires the participants to 
supervise a flight in which they face a conflict, being thatanother aircraft is in their path. 
Participants must indicate the conflict by applying a red circle around incoming conflicting 
aircraft. Subsequently, partcipants must decide a course of action to divert the conflicting aircraft 
away from the supervised flight path (action selection). Then, participants implemented the 
decision using a scroll wheel, indicating a new trajectory for the aircraft leading the conflict 
(action implementation). Lastly, participants were required to press the engagement button to 
execute the implemented decision.  After a controlled temporal delay, participants received 
feedback as to whether the conflict is resolved. Then participants are required to estimate the 
internal delay. Image appears courtesy of Berberian et al. (2012).  
 
In another recent study manipulating sense of agency, the experimenters gave participants 
in different groups different sets of information to manipulate their belief about the causal 
relationship between action and outcome (Parvin, McDougle, Taylor, & Ivry, 2018).  
Participants performed a reaching task to one of two targets by performing a shooting 
movement towards the selected target (Figure 1.4).  
 
One group of participants (a “sense of agency” group) was told that trial outcome 
(win/loss) was related to the accuracy of their reaches towards a target. A second group 
was told that the outcome was related only to the selected target and its reward properties.  
 
In reality the two targets had an equivalent expected value- which was achieved by 
predetermining reward schedule and the probability of hit and thus the outcomes for both 
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groups were the same, whether or not participants were told they were in control. The 
expected value of targets in individual trials differed throughout the experiment. 
 
Importantly, while participants movement towards the target there was no online visual 
feedback (Figure 1.4). This  lack of feedback while executing shooting was important 
because it could influence the sense of agency in two ways: (1) Instant visual feedback of 
trajectory might generate a belief of sense of agency in the condition where participants 
were told that they were not in control (Farrer et al., 2008; Moore & Haggard, 2008; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004); and (2) Since the success probabilities were 
predetermined, participants were either given veridical feedback or false feedback and to 
avoid mismatch between proprioceptive signals and visual information, it was important 
to blind participants to their online movements.   
 
Selecting a target with lower hit probability and higher reward was defined as risky; 
participants’ choice biases was calculated the ratio of the amount of risky target over the 
total number of trials. The results showed that participants in the agency group exhibited 
more risk seeking than the group who did not have information about agency, even though  
the outcomes were equivalent across both conditions (Parvin et al., 2018).  
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Figure 1.4 A Sensorimotor Agency Task. In one group, subjects were told that they do not 
have any control of the consequences of the choices: that the outcome is pre-programmed. In the 
latter group, participants were told that they were in control. This manipulated the sense of 
agency. Participants required to shoot the target to select. There are two possible outcomes: hit 
and miss. Hit outcome is when the endpoint of the participants’ endpoint falls within the targeted 
circle. Miss outcome is when the endpoint of the participants’ endpoint falls out of the targeted 
circle. Image appears courtesy of Parvin et al., (2018). 
 
As the two experiments presented above have illustrated, the manipulation of agency can 
have a profound impact on one’s decision-making strategy. Related work has examined 
whether choice behaviour deviates from optimality when agency is manipulated. As 
described earlier, work applying Bayesian decision theory on sensorimotor decision 
making tasks has shown behaviour to be close to optimal, but this is not always the case 
(Green, Benson, Kersten, & Schrater, 2010; Ma, 2019; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Wu, 
Delgado, & Maloney, 2009). Indeed, the degree of control one is able to exert on the 
environment and prior information can have a profound impact on this deviation. 
Variation in, or deviation from, optimality seems to be related to knowing prior 
probabilities and conditional probabilities accurately (Green et al., 2010; Ma, 2019) or 
not knowing them at all (Sanborn & Chater, 2016). To illustrate, we consider one of the 
most influential examples from the literature next. 
 
Green et al., (2010) investigated whether people make optimal decisions when they are 
in control of the environment compared to when the computer controls the environment 
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in a probability matching task. The task they used involved a roulette wheel consisting of 
pieces in two alternating colours on top of which an arm would spin (see Figure 1.5). To 
win, participants were asked to decide which colour the arm would stop on.  
 
The experimenters employed two manipulations. In one, the sense of agency was 
manipulated with either the computer or the participants stopping the arm from spinning. 
Participants thought they were in control of stopping the arm; however, the termination 
was determined by the computer. In the second manipulation, the accuracy of the 
representations of the visual information and corresponding probabilities manipulated. 
The roulette wheel was divided into either equal or unequal pieces. However, in both 
cases the visual appearance of equal division did not accurately reflect the probability of 
what colour the arm would stop on, as the results were predetermined. Whilst visually it 
appears there is an equal probability of the arm landing on a particular coloured piece, the 
participant's experience should inform them that this is not the case and they should adapt 
a different betting strategy. 
 
The result showed that participants chose a piece’s colour with high probability of win 
when they thought they were in control and the pieces showed an accurate representation 
of the probability of winning. Interestingly, when there was a visually inaccurate 
representation of landing on the equal pieces and when they thought they were not in 
control, they were more likely to make suboptimal decisions- despite the outcomes being 
the same across all conditions.  
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Figure 1.5 Agency in a probability matching task. A roulette game where a computer 
determines where the roulette arm terminates. Even though the computer stops the arm in 
all conditions, the participants believe they are in control of the termination of the arm in 
one condition. The roulette wheel appears to be divided into either even or uneven pieces; 
however this uneven distribution is an inaccurate representation of probability of landing 
on a colour in all conditions. Selecting the bigger pieces are optimal choices, where the 
probability of winning is higher. This figure is adapted from Green et al., (2010). 
 
To provide an analogue of these types of decisions with those faced in real life, consider 
the process of commuting to work. If you decide to drive, you control the speed of the 
vehicle, the route you take and how frequently you would like to stop in the middle of the 
journey. However, if you take the bus, you accept there are elements of this travel that 
you will have no choice over- from the speed, to the route to the number of stops being 
made. Of course, you still determine whether you would like to get on the bus, and at 
which stop you would like to step off, but there is clearly less perceived control over the 
outcome (arriving to work on time) in this scenario than driving. In reality, there may be 
factors beyond one’s control (consider an earlier accident pile-up closing off a road) that 
impact on the outcomes which outweigh the impact of one’s choices and control. 
Decisions that rely heavily on sensorimotor demands to execute these choices, may 
inadvertently increase one’s perception of agency, above and beyond the task 
characteristics- feeling like one is in the driving seat rather than at the mercy of the bus 
driver.  
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1.2.3.2 Feedback for Decision-making 
The previous work has shown the importance of task-relevant information in modulating 
choice selection. A critical source in learning about the task and how to optimise 
behaviour for it comes from the feedback we receive following an action. There is a 
critical distinction in the literature on motor control which distinguishes between two 
types of feedback- one indicated “knowledge of results” (a binary form of information 
i.e. was my action successful or not relative to the goal) and a second which provides 
information about the quality of the action – often referred to as “knowledge of 
performance” (Gentile, 1972; Kernodle & Carlton, 1992).  
Whilst the former is often more readily implemented in the real world (think of a sports 
setting- it is much easier for a coach to indicate that an action was incorrect than state 
how it was incorrect) and is better than no feedback at all for learning (Travlos & Pratt, 
2011), it is knowledge of performance that is the most optimal form of feedback.  
 
Recent work manipulating these forms of feedback in decision-making has shown how 
this information can impact on reinforcement learning processes (i.e. in value update rate) 
and consequently bias decision-making. McDougle et al (2010) asked participants to 
complete a two alternate forced choice decision-making task under a variety of 
conditions. The probability of reward for each target and magnitude varied across trials 
but the expected value remained equivalent. In Experiment 1, they asked participants to 
make choice selections using a keyboard (pressing a left or right key to indicate a target). 
Here, they observed risk aversion – which, as highlighted in earlier sections, is typical in 
situations of uncertainty. In Experiment 2, participants had to make reaching movements 
towards the targets under two different feedback conditions- one in which knowledge of 
performance (or spatial feedback) was provided and a second in which only knowledge 
of results (binary feedback) was provided (Figure 1.6). The results show that participants 
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adopted more risk-seeking strategies (choosing targets with lower probabilities of success 
and higher reward) when exposed to spatial feedback relative to the binary feedback 
conditions. Both conditions showed higher rates or risk propensity relative to the 
keyboard selection.  
 
 
Figure 1.6 A sensorimotor decision task from McDougle et al. (2016). Participants are 
required to make a decision between two targets by reaching the target. There are two possible 
outcomes: hit and miss. In the Binary condition, participants are not shown the endpoint of a 
cursor. Instead they only see the points awarded. If it is a miss trial, participants do not receive 
any points. In the Spatial condition, participants are shown the endpoint of the cursor they control 
for both miss and hit trials. Image appears courtesy of McDougle et al. (2010).  
 
The importance of feedback is of course well-established for sensorimotor learning 
(Keogh & Hume, 2012) and the ability to be able to interact in a precise and coordinated 
manner with the world around us is dependent on the richness of the available feedback 
(Burton & Rodgerson, 2001; Henderson, Sugden, & Barnett, 1992) but what the 
experiments by McDougle et al (2016) have shown is that the attenuation and 
amplification of information relevant to the sensorimotor domain can bias higher order 
choice selection.  
1.2.3.3 Motor Competence 
Another experiment reported by McDougle et al (2016) asked participants with cerebellar 
ataxia to complete the task. The authors reasoned that participants with limited ability to 
be able to correct the errors of their actions would mean that the manipulation of end-
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point feedback would have no impact on their choice selection, given that it would 
provide information that the participants would not be able to take advantage of. 
Consistent with this prediction, they found cerebellar ataxia patients showed risk averse 
behaviour on the task relative to health controls. Given these findings, it seems that one’s 
ability to be able to act on the information in the environment (which brings us back 
around to the importance of agency) is a critical part of the decision-making process and 
may thus co-vary as a function of one’s motor competence.  
 
Motor competence is often characterised through standardised batteries (Fransen et al., 
2014; Rudisill, Mahar, & Meaney, 1993; Vedul-Kjelsås, Sigmundsson, Stensdotter, & 
Haga, 2012) that capture how quickly, accurately and smoothly one is able to interact 
with the external world. As predicted, in contrast to agency, research has shown that 
subjective perceptions of motor competence correlate well with actual motor ability 
(Robinson et al., 2015).  
 
Whilst an examination of clinical patients with specific cerebellar impairments allows 
one to isolate sensorimotor competence, there are noteworthy difficulties with this type 
of approach. For example, patients with cerebellar impairments are a largely 
heterogeneous sample (Trouillas et al., 1997) and impairments in some cases can have an 
impact on related areas (see for instance, the earlier highlighted work showing the 
relationships between the cerebellum, basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex (Ghez, 1991; 
Riemann & Lephart, 2002); also see other studies showing the effect of cerebellum on 
cognitive functioning (Botez, Botez, Elie, & Attig, 1989; Ivry & Baldo, 1992; Leiner, 
Leiner, & Dow, 1991; Wallesch & Horn, 1990; Watson, 1978)); and recent 
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demonstrations of how the cerebellum is central to the processing of a large variety of 
cognitive tasks; (King, Hernandez-Castillo, Poldrack, Ivry, & Diedrichsen, 2019).  
 
An alternative approach using healthy participants may allow us to probe the impact of 
competency on choice selection without the problems inherent in the use of clinical 
samples. For instance, there is a plethora of evidence showing that when people use their 
non-preferred hand to perform a motor task, they are slower and less accurate at a variety 
of tasks such as writing, throwing and reaching compared to their preferred hand (J. 
Annett, Annett, Hudson, & Turner, 1979; Borod, Koff, & Caron, 2011; Duff & Sainburg, 
2007; Fitts, 1966; Hammond, 2002).  
 
Handedness is considered to develop pre-birth, becoming consistent during childhood 
(Fagard, 2013; Hammond, 2002; Serrien, Ivry, & Swinnen, 2006). The definition of 
handedness in the literature is consistently preferring to use one hand to perform a 
particular task where it is more skilled than the other hand (Hammond, 2002; Serrien et 
al., 2006). Even though individuals can train and use the non-preferred hand for certain 
tasks (Ackland & Hendrie, 2005), the non-preferred hand seems to generate slower 
reactions and greater inaccuracy compared to the preferred hand (Borod et al., 2011). 
Evidence suggests that non-preferred hand seems to generate more error while executing 
a motor task (J. Annett et al., 1979) which might lead to inaccuracy in execution. Thus, a 
simple manipulation of motor competence might be achieved by changing the hand they 
used to perform a motor task.  
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The previous sections have provided some brief introductions to core concepts related to 
action selection execution and we will lean on the ideas from these approaches in the 
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following chapters of this thesis. These chapters are structured in the form of manuscripts, 
with each chapter linked by a core task methodology; will be given in details in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3, any important points will be addressed in the subsequent chapter. 
 
The first experiment introduces a novel two alternative forced choice task that first 
isolates and then integrates action selection and execution into one decision making task. 
The task is inspired by the body of research on economic choice selection and the 
processes underlying sensorimotor execution presented above. This paradigm will allow 
us to examine the influence of feedback, motor competence and agency on decision-
making in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Together, the overarching collective goal of these studies is to better understand the 
bilateral relationship between parameters driving action selection and execution interact 
to produce decision-making. In this way, it is hoped that this thesis will provide a valuable 
contribution towards a growing body of research on decision-making demonstrating the 
importance of examining the intersection between action selection and execution.  
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Chapter 2  Manipulating Sense of Agency in a Motor Task  
2.1 Abstract 
A common observation is that participants seem to exhibit more risk-taking under 
conditions of uncertainty during sensorimotor decision-making experiments compared to 
cognitive tasks that have equivalent uncertainty. One possible explanation for this effect 
is that actions resulting in non-rewards in the sensorimotor domain infer an increased 
sense of agency - with execution feedback allowing participants to believe they can 
correct actions for future reward. To test this hypothesis, we designed a novel experiment 
which required participants to choose one of two moving targets (wide or narrow; the 
selection phase) which they subsequently intercepted (execution phase) for points. The 
wide target yielded fewer points but was easier to hit than the narrow one, with equivalent 
expected value. We manipulated agency over the execution phase using a within-subjects 
design with conditions presented in a random order. In the first condition, participants 
had no control over movement execution and watched the computer randomly trigger 
cursor movement to intercept the target. In the second, participants triggered the onset of 
the movement, but watched the target move at a constant speed. In the third condition, 
participants had full control over the movement onset and cursor speed. When participants 
had no control, or partial control there was no change in risk appetite; however, when 
provided with full control over execution, they showed heightened risk-taking. These data 
indicate that the high-risk propensity observed in sensorimotor decision tasks may be an 
inherent property of the agency afforded by action execution. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Action selection has been widely investigated in experimental psychology (Newell et al., 
2015), but the majority of work has focussed on economic choices (e.g. selecting one slot 
machine over another or, deciding between two mortgage options). As such, this 
phenomenon has largely been studied independent of action execution. There is now a 
growing body of literature recognising that motor control, that is, the systems involved in 
action execution, play a fundamental role in goal-directed decision-making and thus, 
modulate action selection (Wolpert & Landy, 2012).  
 
The need to consider action selection and execution interactions can be illustrated through 
the following example. Consider a golf player working her way around a course. Her 
performance is not only the product of sensorimotor skill (action execution e.g. smooth 
execution of internal motor commands) but is also bound by decision-making. To select 
from a repertoire of possible actions, that is, decide what type of shot to execute and club 
to use, our golfer needs to consider whether the shot is to be played on the fairway or the 
rough, the target distance, wind direction and so on. Crucial to how these options are 
weighed up for action selection is the ability of the golfer to be able to execute the selected 
option effectively. A highly skilled player, believing in her own ability to determine a 
successful outcome is likely to prefer the potential gain of taking fewer shots to reach the 
hole, but a less skilled performer (and one who has less confidence in her own capabilities 
to control the outcome), may choose to avoid any hazards and favour the option of having 
more (relatively easier) shots. This example illustrates how the degree to which one is 
able to control the execution phase of the decision process could influence the selection 
phase. This chapter explores this concept through empirical examination of decision-
making by manipulating the degree to which agents have control (or a “sense of agency”) 
of the execution phase and examines how this impacts the choices they make.  
28 
 
 
 
Definitions of sense of agency vary across psychology (and often delve into the realms 
of philosophy). Most commonly, agency may be defined as the belief in one’s own 
capacity to act (Bandura, 1982; Friston et al., 2013), or the experience of a specific 
movement (Haggard, 2017), but most common, and the definition being operationalised 
here, is where sense of agency refers to being in control of one’s own action (Haggard & 
Chambon, 2012b).  
 
Building up an accurate internal representation (internal model) of the external 
environment is important for one to be able to determine the degree to which one has 
agency over the environment and is challenged by the impoverished and incomplete 
information that arrives through sensory input (Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008). To 
resolve this information uncertainty, one has to interact with the environment and 
understand the consequences of these interactions to develop more accurate internal 
models of the external world (Faisal et al., 2008; Green et al., 2010).  
 
An empirical examination of this phenomenon comes from a study by Green et al. (2010) 
who asked participants to play a roulette game under two possible conditions. In one 
condition, the roulette wheel would stop automatically as determined by a computer and 
in the second condition, the stopping of the roulette wheel was determined by the 
participants through physical interaction. The authors observed that the participants in the 
latter condition were able to select more optimal decisions relative to the former (where 
higher probability of success was classified as optimal).  
 
29 
 
 
This sense of control over outcomes also determines our evaluations of another key driver 
influencing decision-making i.e. the evaluation of rewards and punishments. A basic tenet 
of reinforcement learning holds that action selections that elicit reward, increase in their 
value and increase the likelihood of repeating the action (selection and execution) and 
those that are punished are less likely to be replayed due to a reduction in stored value. 
Recent work has examined how this credit assignment process and thus subsequent 
actions are modulated by an evaluation of the degree of agency in action selection.  
 
In a series of experiments by Parvin et al. (2018), the authors examined whether sense of 
agency could modulate the evaluation of reinforcements and punishments in a 
sensorimotor decision-making task that required participants to make shooting 
movements towards one of two targets with different payoffs, but equivalent expected 
value. One group of participants was told that the feedback following target selection was 
determined by the accuracy of one’s motor execution, whilst a second group were 
informed that the outcomes were the product of the probability of payoff of the target (no 
sense of agency). In reality, outcomes across both experiments were predetermined.  
 
Overall, the results indicated that participants were risk-seekers in the task where the 
accuracy of their motor execution seemed to be important. Additionally, instruction 
manipulation for the second condition (with no sense of agency) resulted in risk averse 
decisions. In these experiments, the authors suggest that a sense of agency meant that 
error was attributed to random variations in execution (motor noise) and thus, outcomes 
on individual trials were uninformative about the external environment and required only 
fine-tuning of one’s internal model for motor execution. In contrast, for the condition 
where there was no sense of agency, the outcome on any given trial could be used to 
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update the valuations of the targets. Parvin et al. (2018) has provided evidence that 
temporal dependence (the belief that a reward derived from a target would be similar to 
previous rewards from the same target) is low when there is sense of agency. Top down 
models of sense of agency suggest that motor errors are perceived as random noises 
because the environment is better understood and thus errors are less likely to occur and 
when they do, are more likely to be ignored.  
 
Another study showed that the information presented at decision outcome could bias this 
value updating process (McDougle et al., 2016). In a conceptually similar two-alternate 
forced choice task, the authors presented results with either spatial information (indicating 
the degree and direction of the motor reach relative to the target region) or binary 
information (indicating that the reach to the target was successful or unsuccessful). When 
outcomes were presented including spatial information, participants had a prediction error 
signal they could use to correct subsequent choices. This resulted in a marked increase in 
participants’ risk appetite relative to the binary feedback condition, which limited 
participants’ capabilities to refine their motor commands.  
 
The performance of a system depends on various contributions of the system's 
components. Feedback can be one of them. Fundamentally, there are two main forms of 
feedback: extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic feedback has external information on agent's 
performance (Schmidt & Lee, 2005) whereas intrinsic feedback is considered 
proprioceptive (Annett, 1961). If the result of knowledge has no external information on 
performance, it can be classified as intrinsic feedback. After a failure, the movement 
adjustment would rely on intrinsic feedback if people do not see their own performance 
externally, which is an example of knowledge of results. People do not see their own 
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performance but they see if the trials were a success or a fail. Thus, they need to rely on 
their instinct to make a better movement. In the current study, participants have to rely on 
the intrinsic feedback in the binary feedback condition, however, the performance has 
been represented externally in the spatial feedback condition. 
 
The present study investigates whether manipulating the degree of control over the 
execution phase of a decision-making experiment could influence choice selection. A 
novel variant of an interceptive timing task (Giles et al., 2018) was designed to separate 
action selection, execution and outcomes. Specifically, on every trial (with a total of 300) 
participants were presented with two targets that varied in length and asked to make a 
selection for the target they would like to intercept in the next phase of the trial: a 1 degree 
of freedom movement task. The length of each target determined its “riskiness” based on 
the self-evident information that a smaller target would be harder to hit than a larger 
target. Participants were also explicitly informed of this relationship and further told that 
smaller targets would lead to greater rewards relative to larger targets. The task simulated 
the characteristics of a canonical decision-making task in which reward probability and 
magnitude are manipulated to pit riskier and safe options on a trial-by-trial basis.  
 
Control in the interception phase was manipulated, such that participants could have 
complete agency over movement onset and execution (referred to as “Complete” agency), 
control only over movement onset (“Partial” agency) or simply watch the computer 
attempt to hit the target at a constant velocity and random movement onset (a condition 
with “None” agency).   
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Based on the findings of McDougle et al (2016), it was predicted that agency effects 
would interact, and be compounded by, outcome presentation. Specifically, it was 
expected that participants would exhibit a risk-seeking decision profile if presented with 
an environment with a high degree of control and presented with spatial feedback on their 
outcomes. The feedback could be used to allow participants to reduce their uncertainty 
about how to interact effectively with the environment and the complete agency condition 
would allow them to exploit this information to maximise reward. In contrast, the 
presentation of binary feedback (success/failure) in a low-control environment would 
increase uncertainty about the environment and removing the ability to correct action 
selection would result in risk-averse decisions.  
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2.3 Experiment 1 
2.3.1 Sample 
Thirty-three people (aged 20-47 years; M: 28.27, SD: 7.40; 23 Female) from the 
University of Leeds School of Psychology Participant Pool were recruited to the study. 
The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) was used to assess participants handedness 
(Oldfield, 1971). Three people were classified as left-handed (EHI < -40), 1 person 
ambidextrous (-40< EHI<40) and 29 people were right-handed (EHI > 40). All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and, no neurological or 
psychiatric history. Participants attended the laboratory once and gave consent to take 
part in the study. All participants provided informed consent to the experimental 
procedure in accordance with ethical guidelines set out by the British Psychological 
Society (BPS). The study was approved by the School of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee (reference: 17-0228). Participants were told they would be remunerated 
between £7 and £10 based on their performance from 10 random trials and overall 
performance, but all received £10 after the study. 
2.3.2 Experimental Task 
This multi-trial, multi-stage task involved a classic interceptive timing task being 
combined with the characteristics of a classic two-alternate-forced-choice task. In the first 
stage of the trial, participants had to make a decision between which of two targets they 
preferred to select. The targets varied in width and this width related to the probability of 
hitting the target. In the next stage the selected target started moving horizontally along 
the screen (after 600 ms, the target disappeared as it moved along a fixed trajectory and 
a cursor would move (under one of three control conditions, described next) to intercept 
the target in a fixed region of the screen. The target would reappear following movement 
termination, with feedback (described below) indicating whether the cursor had 
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successfully interacted the target or not (Figure 2.1). Movement termination is when the 
cursor reaches the blue line where target moves. 
 
The control of the cursor was manipulated, and participants were exposed to three 
different conditions. In the “Complete” agency condition, participants had to intercept the 
moving target using a stylus by (a) accurately anticipating the timing of the target to the 
zone and (b) moving the cursor towards the target with appropriate velocity. In the 
‘Partial’ agency condition, participants only require deciding when to launch the cursor 
by clicking the mouse button. Then the cursor moved towards to target automatically. In 
contrast, in the “None” agency condition, the experiment initiated movement onset and 
controlled the trajectory at a constant speed 1000 mm per second. The idea of timing task 
was derived from removing the movement part from the task and control the timing part 
of interceptive timing task. Every agency condition had 100 trials so, every participants 
had 300 trials overall. 
 
To investigate whether outcome presentation interacted with agency, participants were 
exposed to either spatial or binary feedback. In one condition, participants were provided 
with “binary feedback” where participants were informed only whether the cursor hit or 
missed the target. A “spatial feedback” condition provided information on the endpoint 
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of the cursor and target location, thus indicating the degree and direction of the motor 
error.                
 
Figure 2.1 Interceptive decision-making task schematic. The schematic for left-handed 
participants is represented here (for right-handed participants, the screen was mirrored). The task 
started with participants making a decision between two targets by tapping on one to indicate 
selection. Participants susbequently moved a cursor to a starting position towards the bottom 
corner of the screen. After a random interval between 0-1-0.5 ms, the previously selected target 
appeared and moved across the screen at a constant speed towards a blue line (0.6 ms). Once the 
blue line was reached, the target became invisible (0.9 ms). The participant had to estimate the 
point at which the target could be intercepted by moving the cursor towards the future location of 
the target (the “interception point”) by moving the cursor target in a straight vertical line (the 
cursor position was restricted to one degree of freedom). After the cursor passed through the 
interception point, participants were provided with feedback about the outcome of the trial 
(hit/miss and points). The feedback screens for the spatial and Binary conditions are represented 
in Panels A and B respectively.  
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2.3.2.1  Reward Schedule 
As the focus of this experiment was on whether action selection for reward could be 
manipulated by agency, we needed to control for individual differences in interceptive 
timing ability. To this end, reward schedules were surreptitiously manipulated and 
predetermined.  Both outcome (i.e. the hit probability associated with each target) and 
reward were based on target size (Figure 2.2) such that the expected value was matched 
in every trial and kept constant throughout the experiment. For example, in one trial, a 
“safe” target with 91% hit probability and reward value of 40 points would be paired with 
a risky target that had 15% hit probability and rewarded 242 points. In both cases, the 
expected value was approximately 37. Risk was operationally defined based on the 
probability of hitting the target. Participants received the associated reward value on hit 
trials whereas no points were rewarded on the miss trials. The targets’ location was 
counterbalanced. Target pairs were randomly displayed for each participant, so every 
participant saw the target pair in a random order. 
 
Figure 2.2 Target size, probability and reward magnitude. (A): The relationship between 
probability and target size. It is a linear relationship. When the target size increases, the 
probability of hitting the target increases. (B) The relationship between reward and probability of 
hitting. When hitting probability increased, the magnitude of reward decreased.  
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To fix the hit rate between participants, outcomes were predetermined. As such, it was 
important to control feedback presentation. On some trials, where the predetermined 
outcome matched the actual outcome, the feedback was ‘veridical’. On other trials, where 
the predetermined outcome did not match the actual outcome, feedback was manipulated 
unbeknownst to the participant and participants were provided with false hit or false miss 
feedback. In the spatial feedback condition, in the false hit feedback, the location of the 
target was positioned based on a uniform distribution from the width of the target. In the 
false miss case, the direction of left or right was randomly selected. The error size is 
uniform distribution (0,50) where all possible errors of a random location between 0 to 
50 was equally likely to occur. This principle was applied even in the ‘None’ agency 
condition where the cursor was automatically played by the computer.  
2.3.2.2 Subjective Measures 
Participants were asked to complete a post-experiment survey at the end of each condition 
(Complete, Partial, None). The survey (using a 7-point Likert scale) required participants 
to state the extent to which they agreed with the following three statements: “I felt in 
control of the outcome of the task”; “I was risk-seeking during the task”; and “The game 
tracked my movements accurately”. The first question was to assess the subjective control 
and the second was to assess subjective riskiness. The last question is to make sure if 
there was a technical problem on connectivity of the tablet with the stylus.  
2.3.3 Apparatus 
The task was shown on a 15.6 inch laptop with a screen resolution of 1920x1080, were 1 
cm on the screen corresponded to 56.4 pixels. Participants used a stylus to move the cursor 
on a Wacom Intuos 4 large tablet with 12 in x 18.2 in active area. The stylus was used on 
the screen directly. The task was programmed using Python 3.7.2. 
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2.3.4 Study Design 
A two (feedback type; Binary and Spatial) by three (Sense of Agency; Complete, Partial, 
None) mixed subject study design was employed. Participants were randomly assigned 
to two different groups: either, binary feedback condition or spatial feedback condition. 
The participants in each group performed the tasks in three different conditions: 
Complete, Partial, and None. 
2.3.5 Procedure 
The experiment took place in a laboratory in the psychology department of the University 
of Leeds. Participants attended one experiment session including 3 blocks of 100 trials. 
The sense of agency manipulation (Complete, Partial and None) varied across blocks and 
the order was counterbalanced across participants. After each block, participants 
answered the post-experiment survey detailed above.  
2.3.6 Statistical Analysis 
2.3.6.1 Preliminary Analyses 
A series of preliminary analyses were performed to explore whether there were any 
differences in age (given that this can be an important factor in risk taking, with risk 
propensity declining with age) (Deakin, Aitken, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2004; Dohmen et 
al., 2011; Mandal & Roe, 2014; Mata, Josef, & Hertwig, 2016; Quetelet, Knox, & 
Smibert, 2013; X. T. Wang, Kruger, & Wilke, 2009) and participants subjective 
experiences of the experimental manipulations. Age difference across groups (spatial and 
binary) was tested using a student’s t-test to make sure that group samples were of 
comparable age. Participant responses from the survey were compared between 
conditions through a repeated measure ANOVA (Sense of Agency; Complete, Partial, 
None) (see an example of this in Berberian et al., 2012; Wen et al., 2015) regarding 
subjective riskiness and subjective control to investigate subject perception of their own 
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riskiness and to explore how the agency manipulation was perceived by participants.  
Lastly, to investigate if participants differentiated the subjective control question from the 
technical connectivity (if the game captured the stylus movement), pearson’s product 
moment correlation was conducted. 
2.3.6.2 Primary Analyses 
The dependent variable was the amount of risk propensity participants displayed in the 
task. On any given trial, participants’ selections could be either risky or safe. If 
participants selected the target with smaller width on a trial, their response was considered 
as risky, otherwise the responses on the given trials were considered as safe. The mean of 
the participant riskiness was calculated as the sum of risky choices divided by the trial 
number –after removing failed trials- which was used for analyses. Based on Z scores of 
mean of riskiness with -1.96 to 1.96 cut off, 3 participants were removed.  
 
In addition to the experimental manipulation, the order of conditions was added to the 
analyses to investigate if there was an effect of an order on decision making. Since there 
were three conditions (Complete, Partial and None), there were six possible orders. In 
order to statistically investigate the effect of these factors on participants’ selection a 2 
(Feedback type; Spatial feedback, Binary feedback) x 3(Sense of agency; Complete, 
Partial and None) x 6(order; Complete-Partial-None, Complete--None-Partial, None-
Partial-Complete, None-Complete-Partial, Partial-Complete-None, Partial-None-
Complete) ANOVA was performed.  
 
The ezANOVA package in R was used to run analysis of variance. Bonferroni correction 
was used for pairwise t test for post-hoc test. An alpha threshold of <.05 was accepted for 
significant results in the current study and the rest of the studies presented in this thesis. 
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To provide a measure of effect size, generalized Eta- Squared ( η𝐺
2 )  is reported. 
Generalised eta squared consistently shows smaller value compared to the more often 
reported partial Eta-squared measure but it is considered to be a more appropriate index 
for repeated measures designs (Bakeman, 2005). Guidelines suggest that scores of 0.02 
indicate a small effect size, scores of 0.13 as medium and, scores of 0.26 and greater as 
large effects (Bakeman, 2005). We use this measure and these effect size guidelines for 
each study reported in this thesis.  
 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was used to indicate if the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated for repeated factors in the ANOVAs. Levene’s test was used to assess for 
homogeneity of variance.    
 
Based on the results observed in previous experiments in this area, we expected to find a 
medium effect size (η𝐺
2 = 0.13; Cohen’s d = 0.5 (Cohen, 1988)) for the primary outcome 
of sense of agency and feedback. To obtain statistical power of 80%, with a medium effect 
size in this experiment design, G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
indicated a minimum of 24 participants was required. It is worth noting that this sample 
size also aligned with a similar study (McDougle et al., 2016) , which recruited 20 
participants for each group.  
 
Lastly, it is possible that participants might have been sensitive to target size differences 
because of the reward gap between targets. For example, when the difference between 
two target sizes was extremely high, participants might approach a different strategy for 
target selection than when the target size difference was extremely small. To investigate, 
a correlation for riskiness and differences in target sizes was conducted. 
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2.4 Experiment 1 Results 
2.4.1 Preliminary Analysis  
There was no difference (t(26.4) = -1.06, p = 0.299) in age in the binary feedback 
condition (M=26.88, SD=5.26) and Spatial condition (M=29.59, SD=8.81).  
In order to ensure whether agency manipulation was successfully delivered, the subjective 
control scores were compared between each agency condition. A repeated measure one-
way ANOVA was conducted on subjective control responses (where participants feel in 
control of the task) (Carifio & Perla, 2007). The result showed a difference between 
conditions [t(26) = 18.28, p< 0.01, η𝐺
2  = 0.22]. A pairwise t test showed that participants 
reported that they felt more in control of the task in the Partial (M = 4.42, SD= 1.58, SE= 
0.28) and Complete (M = 4.36, SD= 1.67, SE= 0.29) conditions compared to None (M = 
2.67, SD= 1.57, SE= 0.27) respectively p<.001, p<.001. There were no differences in 
degree of control between partial and complete conditions.  
In order to investigate participants’ subjective riskiness scores between each agency 
condition, a repeated measure one-way ANOVA was conducted on this survey measure. 
The subjective riskiness scores indicated a similar trend. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity was not violated (W= 0.92, p= 0.33). The result showed that 
there was a difference between conditions [F (2,62) = 3.96, p = 0.02, η𝐺
2   = 0.04] (Figure 
2.3). Participants felt more risky in the partial (M = 5.03, SD= 1.47, SE= 0.26) condition 
compared to execution (M = 4.61, SD= 1.89, SE= 0.33), none (M = 4.15, SD= 1.80, SE= 
0.31) condition but these differences were not statistically significant (p’s > .13).  
Lastly, there was no correlation between subjective control and game capturing stylus 
movement (r = 0.074, p = 0.463), which might mean that the participants have perceived 
subjective control questions differently than game capturing stylus movement as 
expected.  
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Figure 2.3 Agency and Subjective Measures of Control and Risk. (A) Participants rated 
if they felt in control of the outcome of the task. The graph shows that more people rated they 
totally agree that they are in control of the outcome of the task in complete and partial condition, 
whereas, in their rate decrease when they performed none condition. B) Participant rated how 
risky they think they are in each session. The subjective perception of their own selection is also 
aligned with the subjective control ratings. The data point shows the individual means and the 
black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
The colour represents the different agency conditions. 
 
2.4.2 Primary Analyses 
A 2 (Feedback type; Spatial, Binary) by 3 (Sense of agency, Complete, Partial, None) by 
6 (Order, counterbalanced session orders) ANOVA was conducted. Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated (W= 0.99, p= 0.91). There 
was no main effect of agency [F(2,36)= 1.88, p = 0.17, η𝐺
2   = 0.03], feedback [F(1,18)= 
0.30, p = 0.59, η𝐺
2   = 0.01], or order [F(5,18)= 0.65, p = 0.66, η𝐺
2   = 0.10] (Figure 2.4). 
However, there was an interaction between order and agency [F(10, 36)= 2.75, 
p=0.013, η𝐺
2   = 0.22 )]. To investigate this interaction, the data were divided by the 
combination of order and condition. Each group was classified by which sense of agency 
condition they underwent in which block. For example, people in the complete condition 
were compared with participants who had the complete condition at the first block, 
participants who had the complete condition at the second block and people who had the 
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complete condition at the third block. For each agency condition the first, the second and 
the third group was compared via a one-way ANOVA.  
 
Figure 2.4 Risk propensity for each condition. The graph shows the mean of participant 
risky selections in different conditions. Participants mainly selected the risky target over safety, 
target in all conditions. There is a bigger variation in selection of risky target in complete 
condition where people also can see the knowledge of performance, spatial feedback. The results 
show no significant differences between these conditions. The data point shows the individual 
means and the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard 
error of the mean. The colour shades represent the different agency conditions. 
 
In the complete condition, the Levene test result showed that the homogeneity of variance 
was not violated [F(2,27)= 2,64,  p= 0.089]. The main effect of the order was significantly 
different [F((2,2) )= 4.70,  p= 0.018, η𝐺
2   = 0.25] (Figure 2.5). To investigate which groups 
were different, we conducted a post-hoc test. Participants who were exposed to the 
complete condition first showed different behaviour (more risk averse) than participants 
who were exposed to the complete condition last (p=0.015). Participants were exposed to 
the complete condition in the middle of the experiment did not differ from participants 
who were exposed to the complete condition either first or at last. In the partial and none 
condition, there was no significant different between orders (Partial [F(2,27)=2.14, p= 
0.14, η𝐺
2  = 0.14)] and None [F(2,27)= 0.22 p=0.81, η𝐺
2  = 0.02]).  
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Figure 2.5 Differences in risk propensity as a function of task order. Participants' 
riskiness level in complete condition. Participants who exposed to the complete sense of agency 
at first were risk averse compared to participants who received complete sense of agency second 
or last. It looks that participants became riskier over time. The data point shows the individual 
means and the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard 
error of the mean. The colour represents the different groups.  
 
The target size differences per target pair differed throughout the experiment. For 
example, in some trials participants had to select between two targets whose hit 
probability was figuratively 56 versus 48 while in others, it was 35 versus 78. In the 
former, the difference between risky and safe target selection was small and in the latter 
it was large and this difference might have impacted on risk propensity. To explore this 
relationship between risk magnitudes (operationalised as difference in size between the 
target pairs) a Pearson’s product moment correlation was conducted. We found no 
relationship between difference in target size and riskiness (r (23) = -0.20, p =. 34; see 
Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6 Correlating target Size and Riskiness. Target size per target pair varies 25 
times. The correlation between these two is very small. Every dot represents the risky target 
selection on average of the difference between target pair. The difference between target pair is 
not related to how risky participants are. Participants are mainly risky regardless of how big the 
difference is between the target sizes. 
 
In summary, there was no main effect of feedback and sense of agency; however, there 
was an interaction between sense of agency and order. The interaction was driven by 
behaviour in the complete condition. Participants who performed in the complete 
condition first exhibited a more risk-averse behaviour than participants who exposed the 
complete condition last.  
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Table 1 Values for means, standard deviations and standard errors in all three conditions. 
 
  
Condition Condition Mean sd se 
None 
First Block 0.63 0.26 0.07 
Second Block 0.72 0.18 0.05 
Third Block 0.72 0.14 0.04 
Partial 
First Block 0.66 0.24 0.07 
Second Block 0.62 0.34 0.10 
Third Block 0.85 0.14 0.04 
Complete 
First Block 0.43 0.36 0.11 
Second Block 0.59 0.27 0.08 
Third Block 0.75 0.28 0.08 
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2.5 Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate whether choice selection (and specifically risk 
propensity) could be influenced by agency and feedback presentation in a sensorimotor 
decision task. Consistent with the hypotheses, sense of agency seemed to influence 
riskiness of decisions. However, specifically, only the complete agency condition led to 
participants exhibiting different risk propensity profiles. Participants who had complete 
agency in the last block were much more risk seeking than participants who had complete 
agency in the first block. Contrary to previous work, this study did not observe differences 
between feedback types in terms of altering propensity to make risky decisions.  
 
The most obvious finding to emerge from the analysis was the interaction effect of agency 
and the block order. Participants that received the complete condition first behaved in a 
rather safe manner compared to participants that received complete condition last. The 
given order of complete condition had an effect on their risky choices. A possible 
explanation for this might be that participants were naïve when they started the 
experiment. Hence, they did not have an accurate internal model about the task 
environment such as target properties. The task was new for them. They might have 
needed to explore the task properties and their own motor performance; hence choosing 
safer options at first. Trial by trial, the internal model about the task environment would 
have been improved. Participants who were exposed to the complete sense of agency 
during the last block had an opportunity to act based on the internal model rather than 
every specific outcome. Hence, failure in the task might be ignored (Green et al., 2010; 
Parvin et al., 2018). When the internal model is generated, the agent’s behaviour would 
be based on the internal model instead of every single outcome derived from each single 
trial. Therefore, when they have one failure from one single trial, they might actually 
ignore the failure and still go for a risky option. It is possible, therefore, that the 
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participants in only the complete sense of agency condition became more risk seeking. 
Analysing participants’ sensitivity to previous outcome can be achieved by calculating 
how often participants switch from previous trials based on an outcome. In the current 
study, the study design fails to investigate how participants switch their behaviour after 
every trial feedback because there was not enough trials to investigate this interaction. 
 
What is surprising is that participants were more risk seeking than expected in the 
condition where there was no sense of agency. This result is contrary to previous studies 
which suggested that people are more risk averse when people perform classical decision 
making tasks (McDougle et al., 2016). There are a number of notable differences between 
the McDougle et al. (2016) task and the current task. Firstly, the target properties were 
visually clear in the current study, unlike McDougle et al. (2016).  
 
In the current task, participants were informed that the larger target is related to the high 
probability of hitting the target and the small target is related to low probability of hitting 
the target. Additionally, in the current study each target pair had information about the 
probability of hitting the targets; however, targets in McDougle's task were visually the 
same and there was no clue about the probabilities of each target; the targets’ properties 
remained uncertain. Thus, participants performed the task under risk rather than 
uncertainty. This may explain why people were risk seeking in the current study. It is 
clear that people generally try to avoid uncertainty (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014), which 
results in not exploiting the target (Heath & Tversky, 1991); however, knowing the target 
probabilities, as in the current study, might result in more exploitative risk-seeking 
behaviour.  
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A key goal of the study was to compare riskiness across different levels of sense of 
agency. Thus, we needed to control other parameters such as expected value between 
alternates. To do that, we needed to fix the probability of hitting the targets. The reason 
we exposed participants to pseudo-veridical feedback is to control for different levels of 
motor variability. Some people might be naturally better at intercepting the target than 
others and so experience different rates of success. This sort of variability could influence 
the selections and contaminate the result; however, knowing that motor variability in 
action increases uncertainty, which affects decision making (Wolpert & Landy, 2012). A 
further study might be necessary to investigate the effect of motor variability on decision 
making (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Contrary to prior studies that noted the importance of feedback type (McDougle et al., 
2016), the results of this study did not show this effect. A possible explanation for this 
difference might be that when there was manipulation of agency, participants might not 
attribute the feedback outcome to their performance. The difference between expected 
outcome and actual outcome might be modulating the relationship more than the feedback 
(Wen et al., 2015). Moreover, it is also possible that people might have a sense of agency 
even though they do not actively perform in a motor task (Wegner, Sparrow, & 
Winerman, 2004) when there is a discrepancy between predicted feedback and actual 
feedback; people are prone to misattribute a sense of agency  to an external source or vice 
versa (Sato & Yasuda, 2005), which might cause a failure in sense of agency 
manipulation. In this study, the subjective control scores, participants reported similar 
experiences of control between partial and complete condition.  This might contaminate 
the results in that participants might feel more in control when they have positive 
feedback rather than negative feedback.  This might require another study where there is 
no sense of agency manipulation. 
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In summary, a sense of agency impacts on decision making, independent of feedback 
type.  A high level of sense of agency might modulate risk seeking. In an unknown 
environment where people do not have an internal model of the external world, people 
might be risk averse, whereas, a high level of sense of agency might result in risk seeking 
behaviour after some experience. Since, sense of agency can be affected by unexpected 
feedback, we need to investigate the effect of actual performance on the decision making.  
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Chapter 3 : Execution Error Feedback and Risk Propensity  
3.1  Abstract 
The study reported in Chapter 2 indicated that decision making may be impacted by 
intrinsic factors such as the ability to control the execution of a motor task (i.e. agency). 
The process of motor execution is a dynamic one that also requires extrinsic sensory 
information from the environment for successful execution. In this way, external 
information that can be used to guide sensorimotor actions may also influence the 
decision-making process. The experiments reported in this chapter aimed to investigate 
the effect of extrincsic sensory information on decision making (feedback). The 
previously presented two-alternate-forced-choice task was employed here while feedback 
was manipulated by varying the amount of information participants were provided with 
at decision outcome. When participants were provided with complete information about 
their performance, they were more likely to make a risky selection than participants who 
were only given binary information about their performance. This effect holds when the 
outcomes were with both veridical and predetermined feedback; expected value for each 
target kept constant.Receiving more information about ones execution error was also 
related to better error correction.. This work extends previous findings from Chapter 2; 
as well as intrinsic factors, extrinsic factors such as the amount of externally presented 
feedback can have on decision making. Receiving execution error signals as external 
feedback (spatial feedback) seems to result in an increase in risk-seeking behaviour as 
well as better error correction compared to binary feedback.  
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3.2 Introduction 
A basketball player approaching the opposing team’s basket has to decide where on the 
court to throw the ball from, since this will determine the number of points they will be 
awarded for a successful throw. If she makes a successful throw from outside of the three-
point line, the team will receive 3 points. If the basketball player takes a successful shot 
from inside the three-point line, the team earns 2 points. Clearly, shooting from beyond 
the three-point line is riskier, as it is less likely to end with a positive outcome because of 
the distance between the net and the player. Now, imagine a basketball player being asked 
to shoot blindfolded and thus, being unable to see where the ball ends up. It would be 
expected that most people would shoot from inside the 3-point boundary line, and in fact 
from as close to the hoop as possible. However, perhaps if you are Kyle Korver or Stephen 
Curry and possess exceptional abilities, then it could be speculated that they may well 
venture to shoot from outside this boundary. This illustrates an obvious interplay between 
sensorimotor competence and task demands, when it comes to decision-making for a 
particular task. A blindfold reduces online information while throwing a ball so the player 
is reliant on their internal models/ or prior information, which may well be sufficiently 
good enough to use to carry out the action accurately for a professional basketball player 
and may push them to adopt a riskier approach. 
 
In classical decision making studies discussed in the first chapter, people tended to be 
more risk-averse in order to avoid losses (Wisniewski, 2000). However, those studies 
largely involved little or no focus on action execution (i.e. the sensorimotor component 
of decision-making). There is a growing body of research focusing on the relationship 
between motor control and decision making. Motor control is computationally considered 
equivalent to decision making (Wolpert & Landy, 2012), and motor control studies 
provide some evidence that people might adopt an optimal behaviour while making a 
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decision (Trommershäuser et al., 2005). There is still a big gap in the current literature on 
the effect of feedback on risk propensity.  
 
Feedback clearly has a pivotal role in motor control (Keogh & Hume, 2012) with many 
studies showing that the type of feedback has an effect on motor performance (Wulf, 
Shea, & Lewthwaite, 2010). Extra information through feedback might  increase the 
speed of learning (Wolfram Schultz, 2017), with faster learning equalling better motor 
execution. As we illustrated in the general introduction, McDougle et al. (2016) 
manipulated the type of decision-making feedback given to participants, who were 
making a decision that required the execution of an action (reaching a target). The 
participants were given one of two types of feedback: Spatial and Binary. Spatial 
feedback gives information on the motor execution error: how far an agent was to the 
success. Whereas, Binary feedback gives information only on whether they hit or miss. 
The results demonstrated that respondents in the Spatial condition, made significantly 
more risky choices compared with those in the Binary condition. It is important to note 
that motor control as well as the sensory information might affect decision making 
(McDougle et al., 2016).  
 
Performance might be a factor manipulating risk propensity. Someone who performs well 
would have a higher hit rate. Consequently, the very same person would have different 
expected values (EV) compared with someone who performs poorly, which might result 
in adopting different strategies in terms of risk. Since a higher hit rate would result in 
higher expected value, the former person could optimize their selection and go for a risky 
target. Thus, motor control can be sensitive to optimizing decisions (Neyedli & Welsh, 
2014). This might confound the researchers’ ability to compare the effect of feedback 
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type on risk propensity. In this chapter, the effect of feedback type on decision making 
will be explicated to enable better understanding of the decision making mechanisms. 
This requires having participants at the same level of motor performance; it is also 
important to investigate the relationship between feedback type and motor performance. 
 
In this chapter, there will be two studies investigating the effect of the individual 
variability of performance and the effect of feedback. We hypothesise that (1) participants 
who are in the spatial feedback condition will have a better performance (hit rate), as they 
have more information about their performance, also (2) since these participants will have 
a better performance, they are more likely to be risk seekers. Being exposed to execution 
error, would lead to riskier future selections; therefore, those receiving spatial feedback 
would select riskier choices. Spatial feedback and binary feedback have different 
information levels; spatial feedback gives extra information on the execution error, 
whereas binary feedback has only the information of hitting or missing. Spatial feedback 
would give less uncertainty about motor execution than binary feedback. This might mean 
people attribute the error to their execution more in the spatial feedback condition. In 
Experiment 2 participants are given predetermined feedback (i.e. feedback independent 
of performance) to make sure they have a similar hit rate to fix the expected value. It is 
also hypothesised that the participants in this spatial feedback condition will be more 
likely to be risk seekers.  
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3.2.1 Experiment 2 
3.2.1.1 Sample 
Twenty-five adults (aged 18 to 33 years; M = 20.64, SD = 4.46; 23 Female) were recruited 
from the University of Leeds Dentistry Department. The Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI) was used to assess participants handedness (Oldfield, 1971). Two people 
were classified as left-handed (EHI < -40), 8 ambidextrous (-40< EHI<40) and 15 people 
were right handed (EHI > 40). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All participants took part in the study as a part of dentistry application. The 
approval was obtained from the local research ethics committee (Reference 
271016/MM/216). 
3.2.1.2 Experimental Task  
The same interceptive decision-making task employed in 2.3.2 was used for this study. 
This was a multi-stage task incorporating a classic interceptive timing task combined with 
the characteristics of a classic two-alternate-forced-choice task. The first stage of the trial 
started with participants selecting one of two targets (target pair) based on preference. 
The two targets varied in width, with greater width increasing the probability of hitting 
the target. Next, the selected target moves horizontally along the screen (after 600 ms, the 
target disappears as it moves along a fixed trajectory). The participants move a cursor to 
intercept the target in a fixed region of the screen. The target would reappear following 
movement termination, with   feedback (described below) indicating whether the cursor 
had successfully interacted with the target or not on the blue line (Figure 2.1). In this 
study, target pairs were represented in the same order for every participant. Additionally, 
the hit rate was not fixed. Feedback on all trials was veridical. 
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 Every participant had 100 trials. Target pairs represented in an order where the magnitude 
of reward and target size were equal for both targets. Then, one gradually increased while 
the other gradually decreased. The former one peaked in terms of reward at trial 25 (vice 
versa in terms of target size), then started gradually decreasing until the target size and 
reward magnitude were equal at trial 50. After 50 trials, the magnitude of target pairs and 
target size was equal again. This is called one cycle of trial representation and there were 
two cycles of trial representation. 
 
Conditions were classified based on the type of the feedback presented to participants at 
action outcome (Spatial feedback and Binary feedback). In the binary feedback condition, 
participants were informed only about whether they hit or miss the target without any 
other visual cues about their performance. In the Spatial condition, participants were able 
to see spatial information regarding their error.  
3.2.1.2.1 Subjective Measures 
Participants were asked to complete a post-experiment survey at the end of each 
condition. The survey (using a 7-point Likert scale, where 7 was totally agreed and 1 is 
totally disagree) required participants to state the extent to which they agreed with the 
following three statements: “I felt in control of the outcome of the task”;  “I was risk-
seeking during the task”; and “The game tracked my movements accurately”. 
3.2.1.3 Apparatus 
The task was presented and completed on a 11.6″ tablet PC with a resolution of 1366x768 
(1 cm on the screen corresponded to 54 pixels). Participants used a stylus to move the 
cursor on the screen directly. The task was programmed by using Python 3.7.2.  
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3.2.1.4 Study Design 
A between subject study design was employed to avoid information transfer from spatial 
to Binary conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to two one of two different 
groups; binary feedback group and, spatial feedback group. 
3.2.1.5 Statistical Analysis 
3.2.1.5.1 Preliminary Analyses 
The groups were tested in terms of normality by Shapiro-Wilk Normality test and the 
equality of variance. If these assumptions had not been violated, the age differences 
between groups (spatial and binary) were compared by independent t test and 
participants’ responses from the post-experiment survey were compared between groups 
by an independent t test. If not, the non-parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test 
regarding Subjective riskiness and Subjective control to investigate the subjects’ 
perception of their own riskiness and to find out if the feeling of control had been 
successfully perceived by participants.  
3.2.1.5.2 Calculating Hit Rates 
In this experiment participants received veridical feedback about their performance and 
we sought to understand the relationship between task success, feedback and risk 
propensity. We reasoned that smaller targets would be harder to hit than larger targets 
(Tresilian, 2012; Tresilian, Oliver, & Carroll, 2003) and that the provision of spatial and 
binary feedback would modulate success rates. Specifically, we expected that the Spatial 
group would, through additional feedback about how to correct performance errors, learn 
more about the task and this would ultimately lead to higher hit rates relative to the Binary 
condition.  
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To examine this, participants mean hit rates for different target size conditions were 
calculated and data points were fitted using a linear model for each feedback condition. 
Then, the two linear models were compared by using the pairwise comparison emtrend 
function in the emmeans package in R. The emmeans package is used to acquire estimated 
marginal means for various models such as generalized linear models, models for counts, 
multivariate, multinomial, and ordinary responses (Lenth, Singmann, Love, Buerkne, & 
Herve, 2019). The emtrend allows one to compare two fitted models to one continuous 
predictor interaction with a categorical predictor (Lenth et al., 2019). 
 
To investigate the correlation between the riskiness and performance, target size was 
grouped according to pixel size (20- 30; 31- 41; 42-52; 53-63; 64-74 and, 75- 85 pixels; 
please refer to the apparatus to convert from pixels to cm).  Then we averaged the hit rate 
based on these categories for each participant to generate z scores for each category per 
participant. Then we averaged the z scores within each participant to have a unique score 
for each participant. After that, participants’ risk scores were compared with participants 
hit rate by using the Spearman rank correlation as assumptions of normality were violated. 
3.2.1.5.3 Quantifying Risk Propensity 
The primary dependent variable in this study was participants risk propensity. On each 
trial, a participants’ selection could either be risky or safe. If participants selected the 
target with smaller width than the other target width on a given trial, their response was 
considered as risky, otherwise the responses to the given trials were considered as the 
safety target. The mean of the participant riskiness is calculated by sum of risky choices 
divided by trial number which was used for analyses. Riskiness varied from 1 to 0, where 
1 is risky and 0 is safe and neutral choice would be 0.5. 
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The groups were tested in terms of normality by Shapiro-Wilk Normality test and the 
equality of variance. If these assumptions had not been violated, the difference of risk 
propensity between groups (spatial and binary) was compared between groups by 
independent t test. If not, the non-parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test was 
deployed. 
3.2.1.5.4 Switch Analyses 
To investigate whether participants were sensitive to outcomes on trials and how this 
feedback might influence choice strategy, we performed a 2 (feedback; spatial and binary) 
X 2 (previous selection; risky, safe) X 2 (outcome; miss and hit) mixed ANOVA. 
3.2.1.5.5 Error Correction 
To understand how much participants corrected their movements in response to the 
externally presented feedback, we calculated a measure of error correction. Data for error 
correction was derived by subtracting the spatial error shown on the previous trial (both 
hit and miss) from the spatial error on the subsequent trial. We reasoned that error 
correction in the binary feedback condition would be driven by intrinsic information 
whilst participants in the Spatial condition could see use the externally presented 
information to make their corrections. Data points were fitted using a linear model 
through the lm function in R for each feedback condition. A very steep slope would 
indicate that participants made larger corrections for the error on the previous trial. The 
two linear models were then compared using the pairwise comparisons emtrend function 
in emmeans package.  
 
The ezANOVA package in R was used to run the analysis of variance. Bonferroni 
corrections was used applied to all post-hoc comparisons.  
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3.2.2 Results  
3.2.2.1 Preliminary Analysis  
The comparison of participants’ age in the Binary feedback condition (M=20.38, 
SD=4.25) and participants’ age in the Spatial condition (M=20.92, SD=2.85) showed no 
significant difference between the two groups (t(22)=-0.29, p = 0.774). 
 
The subjective risk scores for binary feedback (W=0.87589, p= 0.06276) and spatial 
feedback (W=0.92836, p = 0.3631) did not violate the normality assumption. There was 
no significant difference between the variances of the two sets of data [F(11,12) = 1.2924, 
p = 0.678]. There were no differences in subjective risk  (M = 4.69, SD= 1.84, SE= 0.51 
for binary; M = 4.58, SD= 1.62, SE= 0.47 for spatial) between the two groups (t(23) = 
0.15639, p = 0.877).   
 
The subjective control scores for binary feedback (W= 0.72016, p = 0.001) and spatial 
feedback (W= 0.93911, p = 0.487) did not violate the normality assumption. There was 
no significant difference between the variances of the two sets of data [F(11,12) = 0. 
73151, p = 0.5982]. The independent t test was computed and there were no differences 
in subjective control (M = 4.23, SD= 0.93, SE= 0.26 for binary; M = 3.92, SD= 1.08, SE= 
0.31 for spatial) between the two groups (t(23) = 0.78083, p = 0.4429). Since the 
normality of samples assumption for the parametric test was violated,  a non-parametric 
2- group Mann-Whitney U Test was also conducted for subjective control scores between 
the two groups, but the result showed that the differences between groups were equal to 
zero (W = 93. p = 0.4086).  
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Figure 3.1 Subjective ratings of control and riskiness as a function feedback. A) 
Participants rated if they felt in control of the outcome of the task. There was no significant 
difference between each group regarding subjective control as expected. B) Participants rated how 
risky they thought they were in each session. The subjective perception of their own selection is 
also aligned with the subjective control ratings. There was no significant difference between each 
group regarding subjective riskiness. The data point shows the individual means and the black 
circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
To summarise, participants’ age did not vary between groups. The subjective control 
results indicated that both groups felt control to similar degrees (Figure 3.1A). The 
subjective riskiness results indicated that levels of risk seeking behaviour for both groups 
were similar (Figure 3.1B).  
3.2.2.2 Primary Analyses 
3.2.2.2.1 Hit Rate Analyses 
To investigate the relationship between participant performance (hit rate) and target size 
for both spatial and binary feedback condition, the mean hit rate for each target size was 
taken for each participant. The linear models from the two groups were represented in 
Table 2. The linear model for binary feedback showed a smaller value for slope 
suggesting that the hit rate changes marginally as a function of target size compared with 
spatial feedback. On the other hand, the linear model for spatial feedback suggests that 
participants had a better hit rate when the target size was larger. The pairwise comparison 
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between the two models showed that these two models were significantly different from 
each other (t(984) = -3.729, p=0.0002) (Figure 3.2).   
Table 2  The results of fitted linear model for each condition. 
 
We then averaged riskiness score for each participant, where 0 was safest and 1 was 
riskiest, based on their selection. These riskiness scores failed the normality test (W = 
0.88013, p = 0.00695); therefore, the Spearman rank correlation was conducted to 
investigate the relationship between participant hit rate and riskiness score. There was a 
significant correlation (r(25) = .407, p = 0.043), indicating that participants’ risk seeking 
increased when participants' performance increased. 
 
Feedback type ß df Lower confidence 
level interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary 0.002 984 0.001 0.004 
Spatial 0.006 984 0.005 0.007 
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Figure 3.2 Linear models for spatial and binary feedback groups. The spatial feedback 
model suggests that the hit rate increases based on the target size more than binary feedback 
model. The models are significantly different than each other. The longest target size/width is 85 
pixels and the shortest target size/width is 20 pixels. The models were generated using the lm 
function in R.  
 
3.2.2.2.2 Riskiness Analyses 
Our hypothesis was that the amount of information presented in movement feedback 
would affect risk taking behaviour. Whilst the pattern of decision strategies ranged only 
from the risk-neutral to risk-averse, there was a marked difference in target preference 
with participants in the Binary condition consistently preferring to select the targets with 
the largest width (safest options) (Figure 3.3 A&B).   
The normality assumption of mean of riskiness for spatial feedback was not violated 
(W=0.91106, p = 0.2201); for binary feedback was violated (W= 0.75978, p = 0.0023). 
There was no significant difference between the variances of the two sets of data 
[F(11,12) = 0.929, p = 0.896]; therefore, an independent t-test was computed. This 
showed significant differences in riskiness between two groups (t(23) = -4.094, p < 
0.001); however, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U Test was also conducted because 
of failing normality test of riskiness in the binary feedback condition. The result also 
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showed a significant difference (W = 21, p = 0.002). Averaged across trials, the binary 
feedback condition (M=0.15, SD=0.19, SE=0.05) showed more risk averse behaviour 
than the spatial feedback condition (M=0.47, SD=0.20, SE= 0.06) (Figure 3.3D). This 
pattern remained consistent over time, with participants adopting similar strategies on 
both cycles of trial presentation.   
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Figure 3.3 Risk Propensity and Hit Rate as a fucntion of feedback.  A) Moving averages 
of participants’ risky selections from binary values where 1 is risky and 0 is safe. The two lines 
represent spatial (blue) and binary (red) groups across time (from trial 1 to trial 100). Participants 
in the Spatial condition adopted more risk-seeking behaviour relative to participants in the Binary 
condition throughout the experiment. The black dotted line indicates neutral behaviour. B) 
Participant selection of the probability of target represented as moving average. The participants 
in the Spatial condition are selected targets with risky probabilities more than participants in the 
Binary condition. C) Hit performance for both groups was generally low, however, the hit 
performance of participants in the Spatial condition remained relatively constant throughout the 
experiment, whereas, participants’ performance in the Binary condition increases towards the end. 
Towards the end of the experiment, even if participants perform more or less similar, there appears 
to be a confound due to change in target size. D) Mean of riskiness of each group. It is clear that 
participants in the Spatial condition were more risk-seeking than participants in the Binary 
condition. The data point shows the individual means and the black circle represents the group 
mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
3.2.2.2.3 Error Correction Analyses 
To investigate the participants’ performance, we also took the error correction into 
consideration. The linear models from the two groups are represented in Table 3.  
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Table 3 The results of fitted linear model for each group. 
 
The linear model for binary feedback shows a small value for slope suggesting that the 
model is skewed from the idealised error correction model. On the other hand, the linear 
model for spatial feedback was closer to the ideal error correction model. The pairwise 
comparison between the two models showed that these two models were significantly 
different from each other (t (2336) = 14.622, p< .0001) (Figure 3.4).  The result indicated 
that participants in the Spatial group used the feedback from spatial error to inform their 
behaviour on subsequent trials and this degree of correction was greater than that in the 
Binary group.  
Feedback type ß df Lower confidence 
level interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary -0.364 2336 -0.404 -0.324 
Spatial -0.921 2336 -0.983 -0.858 
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Figure 3.4 Error correction based on previous feedback.  On the x axis, the value of last 
seen spatial error (mm) on previous trial. On the y axis, the differences between their last seen 
spatial error value and their current spatial error value (mm). An ideal person who would correct 
the error accordingly has been shown as dotted line in the graphs. In the graph participants purple 
line in the Spatial group shows that the linear model of participants’ correction approaches the 
ideal error correction. However, the linear model in the Binary group does not present a well-
adjusted error correction. The correction in the Binary group should be intrinsic error correction 
based on the knowledge of result, whereas, participants in the Spatial condition actually see the 
spatial feedback in every trial. Each data point shows an individual trial. 
 
3.2.2.2.4 Switch Analyses 
The final analysis of these data investigated whether people switched decisions from risky 
option to safe option and vice versa, after they had a miss or a hit depending upon the 
feedback type. A 2 (feedback type; binary, spatial) by 2 (outcome; miss, hit) by 2 
(previous selection; risky, safe) mixed design ANOVA was conducted.  There was a main 
effect of previous selection [F(1,18) = 20.84, p < .0001, η𝐺
2   = 0.363]. There was also an 
interaction between feedback type and previous selection [F(1,18) = 16.587, p < .0001, 
η𝐺
2   = 0.312] and between outcome and previous selection [F(1,18) = 34.542, p < .0001, 
η𝐺
2   = 0.108]. Participants tended to switch their selection more if their previous selection 
had been risky (M=0.52, SD=0.31, SE= 0.05) rather than safe (M=0.22, SD=0.17, 
SE=0.03). In terms of feedback and previous selection interaction, simple effect analyses 
were conducted. First the data was split based on previous selection as risky and safe and 
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the difference between feedback types was analysed using a pairwise t test with 
Bonferroni correction. Participants in the Binary group switched more after a risky choice 
than participants in the Spatial group (p<0.001). In other words, participants in the spatial 
feedback group were more likely to stick to their risky selection. As expected, participants 
in the Binary group switched less after a safe choice than participants in the Spatial group 
(p<0.001); however, switch rate in the Spatial group remained similar after both risky and 
safe selection (p= 0.32) (Figure 3.5 A&B).  
 
Secondly, the data was split based on previous selection as risky and safe and the 
difference between outcomes was analysed using a pairwise t-test with Bonferroni 
correction. After a safe decision, participants were likely to switch the selection when 
they missed more than they hit (p= 0.045). Participants’ switch rate after a hit was higher 
when their previous selection was risky rather than when their previous selection was safe 
(p<0.001). After a miss, participants were more likely to switch the selection if their 
previous selection was risky rather than if their previous selection was safe (p= 0.054) 
(Figure 3.5C &D).However, the marginal difference should be regarded as non-
significant as the criteria of alpha threshold is considered p<0.5 in this thesis.  
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Figure 3.5 Switch Rates as a Function of Previous Choice. A) Participants were more 
likely to switch their selection after a risky choice in the Binary group compared to the Spatial 
group. B) As might be expected participants were also more likely to switch their selection after 
a safe choice in the Spatial group compared to the Binary group. When there was more 
information about their own motor execution, they were more likely to switch to risky selection. 
C) Participants were more likely to switch after a risky choice, however, D) After a safe choice, 
participants more likely to switch if they missed and they were more likely to stick their safe 
decision after a hit. The data point shows the individual means and the black circle represents the 
group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
To sum up, the Spatial feedback condition resulted in a higher hit rate and higher risk-
seeking behaviour. Participants in the spatial feedback group adopted a well-adjusted 
error correction, significantly different to the binary feedback group. Spatial feedback 
resulted in fewer switches after a risky decision whereas, the switch rate after a risky 
selection was significantly higher for the Binary group. Switch rate after a miss or hit was 
modulated by previous selection. The previous risky selection resulted in higher switch 
rate for both miss and hit. When the previous selection was safe, the switch rate was high 
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for a miss more than a hit. In other words, people who missed in the safe selection tended 
to switch more compared to people who hit in safe selection.  
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3.2.3 Discussion  
Consistent with the hypotheses, it was found that increasing information on feedback has 
an impact on risk appetite. Specifically, spatial feedback is correlated to higher hit rates 
and results in higher risk seeking behaviour when making discrete decisions. It is worth 
noting that although there are differences in nomenclature, the feedback conditions 
constitute classic feedback manipulations of knowledge of results and knowledge of 
performance- long known to have differential effects in the learning of a skilled motor 
activity. The latter provides more information to the learner (Gentile, 1972) and therefore, 
it was reasoned that participants provided with this feedback would be able to more 
readily optimize and thus be biased towards selecting riskier options in an attempt to 
maximize reward, relative to the binary feedback condition. 
 
A key finding from these results is the degree of error correction exhibited by each group. 
Participants in the spatial feedback condition made more corrections than participants in 
the binary feedback condition. This may be related to the information provided to both 
conditions; the information on how to correct the error is more effective than just being 
informed of an error (Kernodle & Carlton, 1992). The details of performance were 
externally available for spatial feedback; however, the participants in the Binary feedback 
did not have any external information about the error. Accordingly, they did not know 
externally how to correct the error. Since the error was not explicitly given in the Binary 
feedback, participants needed to rely on their own sensory perceptual information that 
was accessible as a consequence of movement being enacted (van Vliet & Wulf, 2006); 
therefore, those in the binary feedback condition had to rely on intrinsic feedback. Hence, 
any correction would be the result of proprioceptive information; therefore, they 
presumably made worse corrections which might also explain why they had a worse hit 
rate than participants in the Spatial feedback condition. 
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In contrast to the findings in Chapter 2, risk propensity was significantly different 
between the two different feedback types. Participants in the binary feedback condition 
showed a biased selection towards being risk averse whereas participants in the Spatial 
condition seemed to be neutral. A possible explanation for this might be that when a 
failure is attributed to motor execution, reinforcement learning might be adjusted 
(McDougle et al., 2016). Receiving feedback on the agent’s own performance might 
relate to assigning the credit to agency rather than external factors (McDougle et al., 2016; 
Parvin et al., 2018). Less information about motor execution might not result in learning, 
which then causes a selection bias.  
 
Rewards were linked to the target difficulty but hit probability could not be controlled; as 
such, the participants’ own motor competence determined the likelihood of reward. The 
results showed that success rates varied as a function of target size and, as expected, there 
was superior performance in the spatial feedback condition with marginally higher hit 
probabilities across targets. Another interesting finding was that participants in the spatial 
feedback condition showed better performance than the participants in the binary 
feedback condition, after controlling for the target size. This might confirm one of the 
expectations that more information would result in better performance (Wulf et al., 2010), 
in this case a better hit rate. Consequently, when people exhibited better performance, 
they were more likely to be risk seeking in a task where the aim was to score as many 
points as possible. The reason why individuals in these circumstances may take more 
risks is that a better hit rate means less error representation. In this score driven task, 
people would aim to reach as many points as possible. Those who achieve more hits might 
actually then select a target which gives higher points. The target with the higher expected 
value- would be an optimal choice to select. It is known that individuals are prone to 
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behave optimally when they execute an action (Neyedli & Welsh, 2014; Trommershäuser 
et al., 2008). Naturally, people would be driven to be more risk seeking because the 
expected value would be higher for risky targets for those receiving spatial feedback, due 
to their higher hit rate. Consequently, a better hit rate might result in risky decisions, 
which, in this study, meant participants in the spatial feedback condition showed more 
risk-seeking behaviour than participants in the binary feedback condition. These findings 
raise intriguing questions regarding the nature and extent of expected value (EV). One of 
the issues that emerges from these findings is the unequal EV value for target pairs. EV 
varies between participants depending on their hit rates; therefore, EV is not equivalent, 
which might pose some limitations. To develop a full picture of this manipulation, 
additional studies will be needed, where the probability of hitting, and therefore the hit 
rate, is not the result of performance but is in fact fixed. 
 
In conclusion, providing information about the execution error resulted in increased risk-
seeking behaviour; however, this might have been contaminated by the variability of 
performance. Different EV might drive risk seeking behaviour; therefore, there is a need 
for an experiment in which the EV can be controlled.  
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3.3 Experiment 3 
The previous study indicated that there was a change in risk propensity for those who 
received execution error information. Differences in motor performance (hit rate) would 
result in individuals having different expected values for the same targets. Motor control 
tasks are sensitive both to the reward values and the probability of success (Wolpert & 
Landy, 2012).  
 
It is understood that people performing motor control tasks tend  to make more optimal 
selections than those who perform selection tasks that do not require motor execution in 
the task (Neyedli & Welsh, 2013, 2014; Trommershäuser et al., 2005; Trommershäuser, 
Maloney, & Landy, 2003c). To avoid the effect of different EV, the hit rate, which is the 
only parameter related to participants’ performance, needs to be fixed. The idea of fixed 
hit rate has been used in previous studies to equalise EV for each target by giving 
predetermined feedback (McDougle et al., 2016; Parvin et al., 2018). In the current study, 
predetermined feedback will be used too, which is independent of performance, which 
enables EV to be kept constant. Uniquely in the current study the EV will be kept constant 
throughout the experiment by fixing hit rate which is independent of performance. 
 
The aim of the current study is to investigate the effect of knowledge of the execution 
error has on risk propensity. The feedback provided will differ in the information 
provided as in the previous experiment. It is expected that receiving information on 
performance (for those in the spatial feedback condition) would make people assign 
greater credit to themselves for the motor execution, than those receiving only 
information on the result (the binary feedback condition). Consequently, participants in 
the spatial feedback condition are more likely to be risk seekers than participants in the 
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binary feedback condition. Meanwhile, the expected value for each target, and of the 
target pairs, will remain constant by delivering predetermined feedback; however, 
predetermined feedback might result in a difference between the participants’ 
expectations of their own performance, and the predetermined feedback they receive 
(reward schedule). 
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3.3.1 Methodology  
3.3.1.1 Sample 
Sixty-three people (aged 17 to 30 years; M=18.51, SD=2.25; 38 Female) visiting the 
School of Dentistry at the University of Leeds, Dentistry were recruited for this study. 
The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) was used to assess participants handedness 
(Oldfield, 1971). Three people were classified as left handed (EHI < -40), 15 
ambidextrous (-40< EHI<40) and 45 people were right handed (EHI > 40). All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Approval was obtained from 
the local research ethics committee (Reference 271016/MM/216). 
3.3.1.2 Task 
In this study, the interceptive timing task reported in Experiment 2 was used, however, in 
this version, outcome feedback was predetermined and participants received pseudo-
feedback based on a predetermined reward schedule and fixed based on target size (Figure 
3.6)  
 
77 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Decision-Making Task Properties. (A) In the current study, participants selected 
between targets of varying widths with corresponding hit probabilities predetermined across 100 
trials; (B) Selecting and hitting smaller targets produced larger rewards relative to selecting larger 
targets; The relationship between target size in pixels and reward is presented in panel (C). (D) 
The magnitude of the riskiness of the decision (difference between the small and large target) 
varied across the task and the target associated with the riskier options reversed once. 
 
Hit probability and reward functions were manipulated according to target size, such that 
the EV was matched in every trial and kept constant throughout the experiment. The 
participant received the associated reward value on hit trials. (Please see 2.3.2.1 Reward 
Schedule for details). In this study, target pairs were represented in the same order for 
every participant (Figure 3.6A, B & C). 
3.3.1.3 Study Design 
A between subject study design was employed. Participants were assigned to two 
different groups; Binary feedback condition and Spatial feedback condition.  
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3.3.1.3.1 Subjective Measure 
Participants were asked to complete the same post-experiment survey at the end of each 
condition. The survey (using a 7-point Likert scale) required participants to state the 
extent to which they agreed with the following three statements: “I felt in control of the 
outcome of the task”;” I was risk-seeking during the task”; and “The game tracked my 
movements accurately”.  
3.3.1.4 Statistical Analysis 
Because of the similar study design to Chapter 3.2 (Experiment 2), the same statistical 
analyses were conducted in the current study.  
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3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Preliminary Analysis  
Participants’ age in the binary (M=18.59, SD=2.55) and spatial (M=18.42, SD=1.93) 
feedback conditions were compared and the result shows that there is no significant 
different between the two groups (t(57.63) = 0.31, p = 0.760). 
 
The normality was tested for spatial feedback subjective risk scores (W=0.88529, p = 
0.003) and for binary feedback subjective risk scores (W= 0.95061, p = 0.149). The 
sample of variance for both feedback conditions was not violated [F(30,31) = 0.72453, p 
= 0.377]. The independent t test was computed and there were no differences between 
subjective risk (M = 3.75, SD= 1.44, SE= 0.25 for binary; M = 3.87, SD= 1.69, SE= 0.30 
for spatial)  between two groups (t(61) = -0.30664, p = 0.760). Since the parametric tests 
assumes the normality of samples was violated, a non-parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney 
U Test was also conducted for subjective risk scores between the two groups, but the 
result showed that the differences between groups were equal to zero (W = 495. p = 
0.994). The normality was tested for spatial feedback subjective control scores (W= 
0.93425, p = 0.057) and binary subjective control scores (W= 0.91819, p = 0.018). The 
sample of variance for both groups was not violated [F(30,31) = 0.49494, p = 0.055]. 
There was no difference in subjective control (M = 3.31, SD= 1.20, SE= 0.21 for binary; 
M = 3.52, SD= 1.71, SE= 0.31 for spatial) between the two groups (t(61) = -0.54801, p = 
0.585). Since the parametric tests assume the normality of samples was violated, a non-
parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test was also conducted for subjective control 
scores between the two groups but the result showed that the differences between groups 
were equal to zero (W = 475. p = 0.773).  
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Figure 3.7 Responses from post questionnaire for each feedback type. A) Participants 
rated if they feel in control of the outcome of the task. There is no significant differences between 
each group regarding subjective control B) Participant rated how risky they think they are in each 
session. The subjective perception of their own selection is also aligned with the subjective control 
ratings. There was no significant differences between each group regarding subjective riskiness. 
The data point shows the participants’ rating and the black circle represents the group mean. The 
error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
To sum up, participants’ age did not vary between groups. The subjective control results 
indicated that both groups felt control to a similar degree (Figure 3.7A). The subjective 
riskiness results indicated that both groups were risk takers to a similar degree (Figure 
3.7B).  
3.3.2.2 Primary Analyses 
3.3.2.2.1 Riskiness Analyses 
In the previous study, our hypothesis was that the amount of information presented at 
movement feedback would affect risk taking behaviour. In this study, we investigated 
whether the effect remains when we control motor performance.   
 
Whilst the pattern of decision strategies ranged only from risk-neutral to risk-seeking, 
there was a marked difference in target preference with participants in the spatial feedback 
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condition consistently preferring to select the targets with the smallest width/safe options 
(Figure 3.8A &B).  The normality was tested for spatial feedback risk scores 
(W=0.93086, p = 0.051) and for binary feedback risk scores (W= 0.97618, p = 0.717). 
There was no significant difference between the variances of the two sets of data 
[F(29,29) = 0.78383, p = 0.516]. There was significant differences in riskiness between 
the two groups (t(58) = -2.5524, p = 0.013). Averaged across trials, the binary feedback 
condition (M=0.56, SD=0.14, SE=0.03) showed statistically significantly less risk 
seeking behaviour than the spatial feedback condition (M=0.66, SD=0.16, SE=0.03). This 
pattern remained consistent over time, with participants adopting similar strategies on 
both cycles of trial presentation. 
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Figure 3.8 Differences in risk propensity and hit rate as a function of feedback. A) 
Moving average of participants’ risky selections from binary values where 1 is risky and 0 is safe. 
Participants in the Spatial condition (blue) adopted more risk-seeking behaviour compared to 
participants in the Binary condition throughout the experiment (from trial 1 to trial 100). Risk 
neutral behaviour is represented by the black dotted line. B) Participants selection of the 
probability of target is represented as a moving average graph. The participants in the Spatial 
condition are selected targets with risky probabilities more than participants in the Binary 
condition which supports the evidence from  A&D. C) The graph represent the actual hit 
performance between two groups, which is quite low for both groups. However, the hit 
performance of participants in the Spatial condition remains relatively constant throughout 
experiment, whereas participants’ performance in the Binary condition decreases towards the end. 
Towards the end of experiment, even if participants perform more or less similar, we know that 
is cofounded by selected target size between two groups. D) The graph represents the mean of 
riskiness between two groups. It is clear that participants in the Spatial condition were risk-
seeking than participants in the Binary condition. The data point shows the individual means and 
the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the 
mean. 
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3.3.2.2.2 Error Correction Analyses 
To investigate motor performance, we looked at the degree of error correction participants 
displayed following each trial per condition. The linear models from two groups were 
represented in the Table 4. The linear model for binary feedback showed a small value 
for slope suggesting that the model is skewed from the idealised error correction model. 
On the other hand, the linear model for spatial feedback was close to the ideal error 
correction model. The pairwise comparison between the two models showed that these 
two models were significantly different from each other (t(5843) = 25.438, p<.0001) 
(Figure 3.9). The results showed that participants in the Spatial group used the feedback 
from spatial error and they behaved accordingly in the next trial. Participants in the Binary 
group only had knowledge of result and presumably they used proprioceptive feedback.  
 
Figure 3.9 Error correction based on previous feedback. On the x axis, the value of last 
seen spatial error value (mm) on the previous trial. On the y axis, the differences between their 
last seen spatial error value and their current spatial error value (mm). An ideal person who would 
correct the error accordingly has been shown as dotted line in the graphs. In the graph participants 
purple line in the Spatial group shows that the linear model of participants’ correction approaches 
the ideal error correction. However, the linear model in the Binary group does not present a well-
adjusted error correction. The correction in the Binary group should be intrinsic error correction 
based on the knowledge of result, whereas, participants in the Spatial condition actually see the 
spatial feedback in every trial. Each data points shows an individual trial. 
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Table 4  The results of fitted linear model for each group. 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Switch Analyses 
The final analysis investigated whether people switched decision from a risky option to a 
safe option and vice versa when they had a miss or a hit. A 2 (feedback type; binary, 
spatial) by 2 (outcome; miss, hit) by 2 (previous selection; risky, safe) mixed design 
ANOVA was conducted. There was a main effect of previous selection [F(1,60) = 17.240, 
p < .0001, η𝐺
2   = 0.0961] and outcome [F(1,60) = 18.359, p < .0001, η𝐺
2   = 0.0392]. There 
was also an interaction between feedback type and previous selection [F(1,60) = 6.795, p 
= .0115, η𝐺
2   = 0.0402]. Feedback and previous selection interaction was investigated by 
conducting simple effect analyses. First the data was split based on previous selection as 
risky and safe and the difference between feedback types was analysed by a pairwise t 
test with Bonferroni correction. Participants in the Spatial group switched more after a 
safe choice than participants in the Binary group (p = 0.004). In other words, participants 
in the spatial feedback group were more risk seeking after a safe choice than participants 
in the binary feedback. As expected, participants in the Spatial group switched less after 
a risky choice than a safe choice (p<0.001); however, switch rate in the Binary feedback 
remained similar after both risky and safe selection (p= 0.18) (Figure 3.10A&B). 
Participants were more likely to switch after a miss (M=0.29, SD=0.18, SE=0.02) than a 
hit (M=0.22, SD=0.18, SE=0.02) (Figure 3.10C). Participants tended to switch their 
Feedback type ß df Lower confidence level 
interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary -0.155 5843 -0.176 -0.134 
Spatial -0.850 5843 -0.899 -0.801 
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selection more after a safe decision (M=0.31, SD=0.20, SE=0.02) than risky decision 
(M=0.20, SD=0.14, SE=0.01) (Figure 3.10D). 
 
Figure 3.10 Switch rate of participants based on the previous selection. The x axis 
shows feedback type in A & B. The x axis in C shows the outcome. The x axis in D shows the 
previous selection. A)  In the Spatial condition after a risky choice people are less likely to switch 
whereas, switch rate is relatively varied after a safe choice. People stick to their choice after a 
risky choice more than after a safe choice in the Spatial group.  B) Participants were more likely 
not to switch the selection after a hit outcome, which is what we would expect. C) Participants 
were more likely not to switch the selection after a risky selection. The data point shows the 
individual means and the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent the 
standard error. 
 
In summary, participants in the spatial feedback condition adopted a well-adjusted error 
correction, which was significantly different from the binary feedback condition. Spatial 
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feedback resulted in less switches after a risky decision than a safe decision. Spatial 
feedback led to more switches after a risky decision compared to binary feedback too. 
Switch rate after a risky or safe selection was modulated by feedback type. The previous 
risky selection and hit outcome resulted in lower switch rate.  
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3.3.3 Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate differences in risk seeking behaviour between 
those receiving different feedback types, where motor actions were involved in a decision 
making task. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that increasing the information 
contained in the feedback, particularly receiving execution error (performance error) 
would have an effect on the decision, in terms of its riskiness. Hereafter the potential 
functional meaning of these results is discussed in more detail. 
 
Firstly, in this study, the feedback type was found to change the risk propensity. 
Participants in the spatial feedback condition were more risk seeking than participants in 
the binary feedback condition. This result was as would be expected from the work of 
McDougle et al. (2016), where receiving information on motor execution error led to 
participants adopting greater risk seeking behaviour, choosing targets with a lower 
probability of hitting. 
 
In contrast to findings in Chapter 2, risk propensity was significantly different between 
the two different feedback types. Participants showed a biased selection, based on the 
error information they received about their execution. A possible explanation for this 
might be that when a failure is related to motor execution, reinforcement learning might 
be adjusted (McDougle et al., 2016). Receiving more information about motor execution 
might result in learning, which then causes a selection bias towards future risk seeking 
behaviour. In Chapter 2 the manipulation was mainly on the way to execute the decision, 
examining the internal factors of the sense of agency; however, in the current study, we 
kept the execution method for the decision constant and manipulated just the external 
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information, which might be related to the sense of agency (spatial feedback). Since this 
can give a chance to control the internal feeling of sense of agency, the manipulation of 
feedback might have affected the risk propensity.  
 
Another important finding was in the error correction for each group. Participants in the 
spatial feedback condition made corrections much better than participants in the binary 
feedback condition, which aligns with the result in the previous experiment. Participants 
in the binary feedback condition only had knowledge of whether they hit or miss the 
target, and so they had to rely on their intrinsic feedback for information about 
performance error. Hence, any correction would be proprioceptive. However, participants 
in the Spatial condition had spatial information as external feedback. Receiving this motor 
execution error might lead to the participants assigning more credit to themselves for the 
execution than to external factors (McDougle et al., 2016). In addition, those that received 
execution error information presumably made better corrections, which can then also 
explain the observation that they had a better hit rate than participants in the binary 
feedback condition. 
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3.3.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, receiving information about the execution error resulted in greater risk-
seeking behaviour. This might be because receiving the information on the execution 
error, might lead people to assign the credit to themselves, and therefore increase their 
future risk propensity. 
 
The results suggest that receiving execution information leads to increased risk seeking 
behaviour compared to those who receive only binary information of success or failure. 
Receiving spatial feedback also results in higher hit rates, which might have contaminated 
the initial results; therefore, another study was conducted where the hit rate was 
predetermined for each target. The results of the second study confirmed those of the first 
that people might be biased towards being risk seeking, when they are given information 
on their execution error.  
 
The predetermined feedback is different to the participants’ own performance so they 
receive misleading information about their own performance, for instance, they actually 
perform worse than the performance they are given in the feedback. This might cause 
them to develop an overrated or underrated belief of their competency; therefore, In the 
next chapter this will be investigated to determine whether there will be an effect of motor 
competence on decision making. 
   
90 
 
 
Chapter 4 : The Impact of Sensorimotor Competence on Risk 
Propensity 
4.1 Abstract 
The previous chapters have examined the effect of feedback on risk propensity. Evidence 
from the previous chapters in this thesis is accumulating for the idea that that risk seeking 
might be modulated by the degree of information available to an individual. Specifically, 
it is proposed that agents who obtain more sensorimotor information about the task (and 
thus greater confidence in the precision of their estimates about gaining reward through 
interactions with the environment) may be biased towards risk seeking behaviours. This 
chapter takes an alternative approach to manipulating sensorimotor confidence by asking 
participants to perform a two-alternative forced choice interceptive decision-making task 
using their non-preferred hand. We reason that this manipulation should result in 
increased sensorimotor noise and reduced precision of the reward estimate leading to risk 
aversion. We test this hypothesis across two studies employing within and between 
subjects designs. The findings from experiment 4 reveal potentially contradictory results: 
while using the non-preferred hand, participants in the binary condition became more 
risk-seeking over time whilst participants in the spatial condition had constant level of 
riskiness over time. In the experiment 5, participants in the binary condition became less 
risk-seeking when switching from using non-preferred to the preferred hand. However, 
participants in the Binary condition seemed to be greater risk seekers compared to 
participants in the Spatial conditions when they need to switch hand after first block. 
Meanwhile, spatial feedback consistently resulted in better error correction than binary 
feedback in both experiments. These findings reveal that there is still much to learn about 
the interaction between feedback and motor skill and how these factors interplay for risk 
taking. 
  
91 
 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Previous literature (McDougle et al., 2016), and the results from Chapter 3 have indicated 
that manipulating the availability of information about one’s motor execution (through 
presentation of binary and spatial feedback) can modulate risk propensity. We 
hypothesised that this may be driven by a change in the rate of information available to 
the agent interacting with the environment, impacting on the precision of the estimate of 
the outcomes of the sensorimotor commands. In other words, when participants interacted 
with the interceptive decision-making task presented to them, there was an increase in the 
uncertainty associated with appropriateness of the executed action in the binary feedback 
condition (where information on action outcome was limited) relative to the spatial. It 
stands to reason that the more precise one’s estimates about the consequences of their 
actions, the better positioned they are to try to maximise utility. Conversely, if the 
mapping between action and reward is unclear or constrained (e.g. via limited feedback) 
then a risk averse strategy seems like a sensible one to adopt until more information has 
been accumulated and can be exploited.  
 
External feedback provides information that allows one to refine their model of the 
environment and body, which helps the motor system to select the appropriate action from 
a repertoire of possibilities (Shadmehr & Mussa-ivaldi, 1994; Thoroughman & 
Shadmehr, 2000). Internal sensory signals and external feedback combine to indicate the 
consequences of a motor action.  We have seen in the previous experiments that 
manipulating the quality of externally presented feedback can modulate task performance 
(and learning) and influence risk propensity. Specifically, we found that providing 
participants with only information about task success (binary outcomes on success and 
failures) meant that these participants were unable to correct their spatial errors as much 
as participants provided with spatial feedback and that participants in this condition 
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showed more risk averse behaviour. When we controlled for task performance by 
manipulating feedback, we found that this risk aversion persisted in this group.  
 
One possible explanation for this finding is that the limited external information 
constrains the precision of ones estimates about the consequences of their actions (relying 
only on proprioceptive signals which are known to drift over time without calibration; 
Wann & Ibrahim, 1992) and thus increases the amount of time one needs to explore the 
environment to obtain a sufficiently accurate model of the task that allows them to 
subsequently exploit. In contrast, external information about execution error provided in 
the Spatial condition indicated on each trial how far away the participants performance 
was to (Schmidt & Lee, 2005; van Vliet & Wulf, 2006; Weeks & Kordus, 1998) and thus 
allowed more precise estimates that could be more readily exploited.  
 
If the explanation presented above holds true, then it is likely that other elements of the 
action-outcome loop that modulates information uncertainty should also lead to similar 
shifts in risk propensity. An individual with a high degree of sensorimotor competence 
would be likely to show risk seeking tendencies and the converse is the case for those 
with low sensorimotor competence. Indeed, consistent with this line of reasoning, 
McDougle et al (2016) demonstrated that participants with cerebellar degeneration 
showed risk aversion relative to neurologically intact controls on a 2 Alternative Forced 
Choice (2AFC) risk taking task that inspired the interceptive decision-making task 
employed in this thesis.  
 
Here, we examine the impact of sensorimotor competence on risk taking through 
manipulating the end-effector used for action execution in our task. We suggest that 
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participants completing the task with their non-preferred hand could present an elegant 
model for an agent with low sensorimotor competence (and avoid the difficulties 
associated with matching neurologically impaired patients with healthy control 
participants (Korngut et al., 2013)).  
 
The majority of people are right handed (approximately 90%) (Caliskan & Dane, 2009; 
Jung & Jung, 2009; Perelle & Ehrman, 1994) and handedness is a key behavioural 
characteristic in motor control, with biases developing pre-birth and becoming consistent 
during early childhood (Fagard, 2013; Hammond, 2002; Serrien et al., 2006). Handedness 
has been described as: (1) one hand consistently preferred for pursue a particular task, (2) 
the same hand is preferred for the most of tasks to be performed, and (3) this hand is more 
skilled than the other in task performance (Hammond, 2002; Serrien et al., 2006). Whilst 
it is the case that people will also use their non-preferred hand regularly (e.g. safely 
manipulating a steering wheel typically requires the use of both hands) and that the non-
preferred hand can be trained to do certain motor task as well as the preferred hand 
(Ackland & Hendrie, 2005), it is most generally the case that the non-preferred hand will 
typically show less accuracy and slower reaction times when compared to the preferred 
hand (Borod et al., 2011).  
 
Following the argument above, using the non-preferred hand does lead to more motor 
noise while executing an action (Schmidt et al, 1979). For instance, when participants are 
asked to execute an action faster (Fitts, 1966) or execute an action with a non-preferred 
hand (Annett et al., 1979), participants trade-off accuracy to achieve the goal. When 
motor noise is high, the precision is low. Evidence suggests that the preferred hand has 
an advantage in learning a novel dynamic task (Duff & Sainburg, 2007; Guiard, 1987; 
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Hammond, 2002; Sainburg, 2002; Wang & Sainburg, 2003). Performance differences 
between the preferred hand and non-preferred hand have been related to a distinction in 
visual and proprioceptive processing (Goble & Brown, 2008; Sainburg & Kalakanis, 
2017). Visual feedback might help the coordination of movement (more than without 
visual feedback) when the preferred hand is used in a reaching task more than when using 
non-preferred hand (Bagesteiro & Sainburg, 2002). Conversely, studies focusing on 
deafferented individuals have indicated that proprioceptive loss might be more critical for 
the non-preferred hand than preferred hand (Bagesteiro & Sainburg, 2003; Renault, 
2018).  
 
One study on handedness provided training first for either the preferred or non-preferred 
limb under normal target conditions, and then the opposite limb was tested when the target 
was displaced or visual feedback was rotated (Sherwood, 2014). The results indicated that 
participants who trained on their preferred hand (right hand) subsequently had more 
accurate movements when using their non-preferred hand. Additionally, the transfer from 
only preferred hand to non-preferred hand had a noticeable effect on final point accuracy 
(Pan & Van Gemmert, 2013; Sainburg & Wang, 2002) indicating that the order in which 
information is acquired (with a handedness asymmetry) could impact on behaviour; 
however, to the present knowledge, no such investigations employing decision-making 
tasks have been employed.  
 
In this chapter the effect of feedback on decision making will be investigated while 
participants perform the motor decision-making task described in previous chapters using 
either their non-preferred hand or preferred hand under spatial and binary feedback 
conditions. We follow this up with a second experiment that employs a within subject 
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design and asks participants to switch between hands during the experiment. For 
experiment 2, we expect that participants will be most risk averse in the binary feedback 
condition when participants complete the task with their non-preferred hand as external 
feedback is limited and sensorimotor noise should be relatively high, thus increasing 
uncertainty about the consequences of one’s actions. In contrast, participants performing 
the task with their preferred hand in the spatial feedback condition should have the highest 
risk propensity. In Experiment 3, we expect to replicate these general patterns in a within 
subject design but also capture information transfer asymmetry, with participants 
performing the task with their non-preferred hand in the Binary condition after 
experiencing spatial feedback with the preferred hand to have a heightened risk 
propensity.  
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4.2.1 Experiment 4 
4.2.1.1 Sample 
Fifty-six people (aged 17-33 years; M: 20.02, SD: 3.05; 39 Female) were recruited from 
the University of Leeds Dentistry Department. The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(EHI) was used to assess participant handedness (Oldfield, 1971). Two people were 
classified as left-handed (EHI < -40), 22 ambidextrous (-40 < EHI <40) and 33 people 
were right-handed (EHI > 40). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All participants took part in the study as a part of dentistry application. Ethical 
approval was obtained from the local research ethics committee (Reference 
271016/MM/216). 
4.2.1.2 Task 
The interceptive timing decision making task has been described in previous chapters and 
for brevity, only the elements relevant to the experimental manipulations are described 
here (Figure 2.1). 
Conditions were classified based on which feedback was presented to participants in the 
task as in Chapter 2 and 3. In the Binary condition, participants were exposed to binary 
feedback: whether they hit or miss the target without any other visual clue about their 
performance. In the Spatial condition, participants were exposed to spatial feedback 
where they could see their error.  
4.2.1.2.1 Reward Schedule 
The reward schedule has been used as it is described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Feedback 
was predetermined based on the same principles (Figure 3.6). Again, hit probability and 
reward functions were manipulated, and accordingly target size for each target, such that 
the expected value was matched in every trial and kept constant throughout the 
experiment.  Risk was operationally defined based on the probability of hitting the target. 
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The target with less probability of hitting than the other is the risky target because it was 
less likely to be achieved compared to the other target. The participant received the 
associated reward value on hit trials, whereas, no points were rewarded on the miss trials. 
The target’s location was counterbalanced. Target pairs were randomly displayed based 
on the same reward schedule for all participants.  
4.2.1.2.2 Subjective Measures 
Participants were asked to complete a post-experiment survey at the end of each 
condition. The survey (using a 7-point Likert scale; where 1 is totally disagree and 7 is 
totally agree) required participants to answer how much they agree with statements such 
as: “I felt on control of the outcome of the task.”, “I was risk-seeking during the task’; 
and “The game tracked my movements accurately.”  
4.2.1.3 Study Design 
As in previous chapters, a between subject study design was employed. Participants were 
randomly assigned to two different conditions: the binary feedback condition and the 
spatial feedback condition. Overall, participants received 100 trials. In addition to this, 
we include results from Chapter 3 to provide a comparison condition. Therefore, the study 
design can be considered as a between subject design, where feedback (spatial and binary) 
and used hand (preferred and non-preferred hand) are independent variables. 
4.2.1.4 Statistical Analysis 
4.2.1.4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
The equality of variance was tested and the normality assumption for the groups was 
tested by using the Shapiro-Wilk Normality test. The age differences between two 
different conditions (Spatial and Binary Feedback) was tested using an independent t-test. 
Participants’ responses post survey were compared between the two experimental groups 
using a t-test or non-parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test regarding Subjective 
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riskiness and Subjective control to investigate the subject’s perception of their own 
riskiness and to find out if the feeling of control had been successfully perceived by 
participants.   
4.2.1.4.2 Riskiness Analyses 
To investigate riskiness behaviour throughout the experiment, an independent t test was 
conducted for risk propensity in the Binary feedback and spatial feedback. Mauchly’s 
Test of Sphericity was used to indicate if the assumption of sphericity had been violated 
for repeated measure ANOVAs. The Levene’s test was used to assess homogeneity of 
variance. Additionally, the results were compared to results from Chapter 3.3 
(Experiment 3) by using two between subject designs. A 2 (Feedback type: Spatial vs. 
Binary) X 2 (Hand: Preferred hand vs. Non-preferred hand) ANOVA was conducted. The 
ezANOVA package in R was used for data analyses. Bonferroni correction was used for 
pairwise t test for post-hoc test.  
4.2.1.4.3 Error Correction Analyses 
To examine error correction, we followed the same analysis protocol described in 
previous chapters. The two linear models were compared by using pairwise comparison 
emtrend function in emmeans package. This has been used to compare the two linear 
models for error correction. These data will be compared with the findings from Chapter 
3.3. The effect of using different hands on error correction was compared for both spatial 
and binary feedback type by using pairwise comparison emtrend function.   
4.2.1.4.4 Switch Selection Behaviour Analyses 
To investigate the switching of the level of risky behaviour, how participants change the 
decision from risky to safe or safe to risky regarding the outcomes and feedback, we 
conducted a 2 (Feedback type: Spatial vs. Binary) X 2 (Outcome: Miss vs. Hit) X 2 
(Previous Choice: Risky vs. Safe) mixed design ANOVA was conducted. Mauchly’s Test 
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of Sphericity was used to indicate if the assumption of sphericity had been violated for 
repeated measure ANOVAs. The Levene’s test was used to assess for homogeneity of 
variance.    
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4.2.2 Results 
4.2.2.1 Preliminary Analysis  
Participants’ age in the binary feedback condition (M=21.29, SD=3.93) and participants’ 
age in the Spatial condition (M=19.03, SD=1.60); was compared and the result shows 
that there is a significant difference between the two conditions (t(28.934)=2.652, p = 
0.012).  
The assumption of normality for spatial feedback condition subjective risk scores (W=0. 
896, p = 0.005) and for binary subjective risk scores (W= 0.914, p = 0.04) was violated. 
The binary and spatial feedback condition of subjective risk scores were not normally 
distributed. There was no significant difference between the variances of the two sets of 
data [F(24,30)= 1.823, p = 0.1196]. There was no significant differences of subjective 
risk  (M = 4.08, SD= 1.87, SE= 0.37 for binary; M = 4.87, SD= 1.38, SE= 0.25 for spatial) 
between the two conditions (t(54) = -1.819, p = 0.074) (Figure 4.1B).  
 
The assumption of normality for both spatial feedback condition subjective control scores 
(W= 0.905, p = 0.01) and binary subjective control scores (W= 0.912, p = 0.034) were 
violated. The spatial and binary feedback condition subjective control scores were not 
normally distributed. There was no significant difference between the variances of the 
two sets of data [F(24,30)= 1.464, p = 0.32]. There was no difference in subjective control 
(M = 5.08, SD= 1.41, SE= 0.28 for binary; M = 4.81, SD= 1.17, SE= 0.21 for spatial) 
between the two conditions (t(54) = 0.794, p = 0.431) (Figure 4.1A). 
 
Since the parametric tests assume the normality of samples were violated, a non-
parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test was also conducted for subjective control 
scores between two conditions and no reliable differences emerged (W = 448.5, p = 
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0.298). Subjective risk scores between two conditions also showed no reliable differences 
(W = 297.5, p = 0.134). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Responses from post questionnaire for each feedback type. A) Participants 
rated if they felt in control of the outcome of the task (higher scores indicate more control). There 
was no significant difference between each condition regarding subjective control as expected. 
B) Participant rated how risky they think they are in each session (higher indicates more risky). 
The subjective perception of their own selection is also aligned with the subjective control ratings. 
There was no significant difference between each condition regarding subjective riskiness. The 
black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
In summary, the subjective control results indicated that the mean of feeling in control 
was similar for both conditions. The subjective riskiness results indicated that both 
conditions showed risk seeking to a similar degree.  
4.2.2.2 Primary Analyses 
4.2.2.2.1 Riskiness  
Whilst the pattern of decision strategies ranged only from risk-neutral to risk-seeking, 
there was a marked difference in target preference, with participants in the Binary 
condition consistently preferring to select targets with the largest width/safe options 
(Figure 4.2A &B) The assumption of normality for spatial feedback condition riskiness 
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(W=0.889, p = 0.004) for binary riskiness (W= 0.913, p = 0.036) were violated. There 
was significant difference between the variances of the two sets of data [F(23,29)= 2.923, 
p = 0.007]. The independent t-test was computed and there were significant differences 
in riskiness between the two conditions (t(52) = -1.517, p = 0.135). Since the parametric 
tests assume the normality of samples were violated, a non-parametric 2- group Mann-
Whitney U Test showed that there was no reliable differences (W = 330.5, p = 0.351). 
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Figure 4.2 Risk propensity and hit rate according to feedback type. A)Moving average 
of participants’ risky selections from binary values where 1 is risky and 0 is safe. Two lines 
represent spatial and Binary condition. Participants in the Spatial condition adopt risk-seeking 
behaviour compared to participants in the Binary condition throughout the experiment (from trial 
1 to trial 100). Participants in the Binary feedback became risk-seeking after the first 50 trials. B) 
Participants selection of the probability of target represented as moving average graph. The 
participants in the Spatial condition are selected targets with risky probabilities more than 
participants in the Binary condition which supports the evidence from  A&D. C) The graph 
represent the actual hit performance between two conditions, which is quite low for both 
conditions. However, the hit performance of participants in the Spatial condition mostly higher 
than participants in the Binary feedback. Even though participants in both feedback conditions 
made a riskier choices after 50 trials, still hit performance is relatively low in the Binary feedback. 
As mentioned, hit performance is cofounded by selected target size between two conditions. D) 
The graph represents the mean of riskiness between Binary and Spatial conditions. It is clear that 
participants in the Spatial condition were more risk-seeking than participants in the Binary 
condition. The data points show the individual means and the black circle represents the group 
mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
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To investigate whether participants changed the degree of risky behaviour they exhibited 
from beginning of the experiment to the end, a 2 (Feedback type; binary, spatial) by 2 
(Sequence; First, Second) mixed design ANOVA was conducted. There was no main 
effect of sequence or feedback. Interestingly however, there was a significant interaction 
[F(1,54)= 5.062, p = .028, η𝐺
2   = 0.03]. Participants in the binary feedback were more 
likely to be safer in the first 50 trials (M = 0.48, SD = 0.36, SE = 0.07) compared to the 
last 50 trials (M = 0.68, SD = 0.28, SE = 0.06; Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 Risk Propensity in Early and Late Stages as a Function of Feedback.  This 
graph represents the riskiness data for the first 50 trials and the last 50 trials in both spatial 
(orange) and binary (blue) feedback. Participants in the spatial feedback condition were greater 
risk-seekers, but participants in the binary feedback condition gradually became risk seeking in 
the last 50 trials compared to the first 50 trials. Error bars represent +/-1 standard error of the 
mean. 
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The comparison with the findings from the previous chapter showed no reliable difference 
between hand used as well as no reliable interaction; however, there was a significant 
differences between feedback type [F(1,115) = 7.11, p = 0.008, η𝐺
2   = 0.058); however, 
the Levene test of homogeneity was violated [F(3,115) = 2.949, p = 0.036]. When 
homogeneity of variance is violated, there is a greater probability of overestimating the 
significance value.  
4.2.2.2.2 Error Correction 
To investigate participants motor performance, we examined the degree to which 
participants corrected their motor errors on a trial by trial basis. The linear models from 
two conditions are represented in the Table 5.   
Table 5  The results of fitted linear model for each condition. 
 
The linear model for binary feedback showed a small value for slope suggesting that the 
model is skewed from the idealised error correction model. On the other hand, the linear 
model for spatial feedback was very close to the ideal error correction model. The 
pairwise comparison between the two models showed that these two models were 
significantly different from each other (t(5286)= 22.820, p<.0001; (Figure 4.4). 
Feedback type ß df Lower confidence level 
interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary -0.163 5286 -0.186 -0.140 
Spatial -0.774 5286 -0.822 -0.727 
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Figure 4.4 Error correction based on previous feedback. The x axis represents the value 
of the last shown spatial error value (mm) on previous trial, and the y axis represents the difference 
between last seen spatial error value and the current spatial error value (mm) on a given trial. An 
ideal observer who corrects error would fall along the dashed line. The purple line is the linear fit 
to the actual data. In the spatial feedback condition, the linear model approaches the ideal line, 
however, the linear model in the Binary feedback condition does not. The correction in the binary 
feedback condition should be intrinsic error correction based on the lack of external error 
information in knowledge of result, whereas, participants in the Spatial condition actually see the 
spatial feedback in every trial.  
 
Error correction comparison with the findings from Chapter 3.3 
To investigate how error correction might be affected by performing the task using the 
non-preferred hand, the data was compared with the findings from Chapter 3.3 (see Figure 
4.5). The binary feedback and spatial feedback condition were separated (see Table 6). In 
the spatial feedback condition, the models of preferred hand and non-preferred hand 
models showed that they were significantly different to one another (t(5850)= 2.07, 
p=0.038). In the binary feedback condition, the models of preferred hand and non-
preferred hand models showed that these two models were not significantly different to 
each other (t(5279)= -0.547, p=0.584). 
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Figure 4.5 Error correction based on previous feedback. On the x axis, the value of last 
seen spatial error value (mm) on previous trial. On the y axis, the differences between their last 
seen spatial error value and their current spatial error value (mm) on a given trial between used 
hands and feedback types. The purple line in the Spatial feedback condition shows that the linear 
model of participants’ correction approaches the ideal error correction. However, the linear model 
in the Binary feedback condition does not present a well-adjusted error correction. The correction 
in the binary feedback condition should be intrinsic error correction based on the lack of external 
error information in knowledge of result, whereas, participants in the Spatial condition actually 
see the spatial feedback in every trial. 
 
Consistent with the previous experiments in this thesis, the result show that participants 
in the spatial feedback condition were able to more effectively make use of spatial error 
information to correct their performance in the following trial. In the Spatial condition, 
participants using preferred hand seems to differ from those using non-preferred hand, 
where using preferred hand seems to have an advantage on correcting spatial error 
according to last shown spatial error. 
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Table 6 The results of fitted linear model between the current study (Non-preferred Hand) and 
the chapter 3.3 (Preferred Hand). 
 
4.2.2.2.3 Switch Selection Behaviour 
Lastly, we investigated whether people switched decision from a risky option to a safe 
option and vice versa- when they had a miss or a hit. A 2 (feedback type; binary, spatial) 
by 2 (outcome; miss, hit) by 2 (previous selection; risky, safe) mixed design ANOVA 
was conducted. There were main effects of previous selection [F(1,53)= 13.211, p < 
.0001, η𝐺
2   = 0. 12] and outcome [F(1,53)= 24.789, p < .0001, η𝐺
2   = 0.035]. Participants 
were more likely to switch if the previous selection was safe (M = 0.36, SD = 0.24, SE = 
0.02) compared to risky (M = 0.20, SD = 0.21, SE = 0.02) (Figure 4.6B). Participants 
were more likely to switch after a miss (M:0.32, SD=0.24, SE: 0.02) than a hit (M:0.24, 
SD=0.23, SE: 0.02) (Figure 4.6). There was also a three way interaction between feedback 
type, outcome and previous selection [F(1,53)= 11.868, p = .0001, η𝐺
2   = 0.02] (Figure 
4.7).  
Feedback 
type 
 ß df 
Lower confidence 
level interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary 
NPH (4.1) -0.163 5279 -0.185 -0.141 
PH (3. 2) -0.155 5279 -0.174 -0.135 
Spatial 
NPH (4.1) -0.774 5850 -0.825 -0.724 
PH (3. 2) -0.850 5850 -0.901 -0.800 
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Figure 4.6 Switch rate of participants based on the previous selection. The graphs show 
the switch rate of participants based on their previous selection. A) Participants were more likely 
to switch after a miss outcome, which is what we would expect. B) Participants were also more 
likely to switch the selection after a safe selection, whereas, they were more likely to stick the 
selection after a risky decisions. The data point shows the individual means and the black circle 
represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean.  
 
Figure 4.7 Switch rates as a function of feedback, choice selection and success.  
Participants in the Binary condition had a similar switch rate for a miss after both risky and safe 
selection; however, they switched more after safe selection then risky selection when the outcome 
was hit. In other words,  the switch rate for miss outcome was similar after both safe and risky in 
the Binary feedback condition, whereas, the switch rate for hit outcome was higher after safe 
selection than after risky selection in the Binary feedback. Participants in the Spatial feedback 
condition had highest switch rate after safe selection when the outcome is miss, this was higher 
than after risky selection for miss outcome, too. Switch rate in the Spatial feedback increased after 
safe selection  in hit outcomes compared with after risky selection after hit. However, switch rate 
for miss outcome was lower than switch rate in miss outcomes. Although, participants are more 
likely to have similar level switch rate after both miss and hit outcome when the previous selection 
is risky. This trend disapperared for selection  after safe choice. The data point shows the 
individual means and the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 
standard error of the mean. 
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In summary, participants in the spatial feedback condition adopted a well-adjusted error 
correction, significantly different than for the binary feedback condition. Spatial feedback 
resulted in less switching after a risky decision than a safe decision. Binary feedback led 
to risk seeking behaviour in the last fifty trial. Switching rates after a risky or safe 
selection were modulated by feedback type, previous selection and outcome. After a miss 
trial, participants were more likely to switch safe decision in the Spatial feedback 
compared to switch from risk to safe. For hit trials the trend was similar but did not differ 
based on feedback type. Lastly, participants did not change the amount of switch from 
safe to risk after a safe choice in the Binary condition. 
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4.2.3 Discussion  
Experiment 4 sought to investigate the relationship between feedback and motor 
competency. In contrast to our predictions, there was no increase in risk as information 
and competency increased. Instead, we found that participants who needed to rely on 
intrinsic feedback (those who received binary feedback, did not receive any performance 
error information) eventually adopted risk seeking behaviour when they performed the 
whole task with their non-preferred hand. The potential functional meaning of these 
results will now be discussed in more detail.   
 
On first examination, the mean of riskiness was not found to differ significantly 
dependent on the type of feedback given; however, when this relationship was examined 
in more detail, the relationship between riskiness and feedback varied across the 
experiment. Where binary feedback was provided, a gradual increase in risk seeking 
behaviour was observed. If binary feedback provides a closer approximation of 
proprioceptive feedback (Adams, 1971), then this finding is as would be expected, as 
current literature states that the non-preferred hand relies more on proprioceptive 
feedback in general (Goble, Lewis, & Brown, 2006; Renault, 2018; Sainburg & 
Kalakanis, 2017). Therefore, for participants using their non-preferred hand, it could be 
why binary feedback resulted in an increase in risk seeking behaviour.  
 
From detailed analysis, a further and unexpected result was obtained; although, the 
participants who received binary feedback demonstrated a gradual risk seeking strategy 
(last 50 trials), participants in the Spatial condition appeared to perform better in error 
correction in the Spatial condition. Participants’ perception of their own performance 
might be higher than what they expected to perform at the beginning of the trial. This 
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might lead over-confidence and they might result in biasing towards risk seeking (Cohen, 
1993).  
 
A limitation of this study was that it could not evaluate whether there was an effect of 
using both the preferred and non-preferred hand within an individual. As such, a further 
study was performed where both the preferred hand and non-preferred hand were used, 
to allow for the comparison of the differences this produced when in the presence of either 
binary or spatial feedback.  
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4.3 Experiment 5 
The previous study indicated an interplay between feedback and motor competence on 
risk taking. In this study, we delve deeper into this relationship through employing a 
within subject design in which participants are asked to switch hands half way through 
the experiment.  
 
The literature on interlimb transfer suggests an asymmetry in information carryover – 
with participants learning more about a task when it is performed first with the preferred 
hand when subsequently performed by the non-preferred hand than the opposite order 
(Pan & Van Gemmert, 2013; Robert L. Sainburg & Wang, 2002). We expected that this 
information transfer asymmetry would also have consequences for decision-making.  
4.3.1 Methodology 
4.3.1.1 Sample 
Eighty-eight people (aged 17-33 years; M: 20.01, SD: 3.30; 61 Female) were recruited 
from the University of Leeds Dentistry Department. The Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI) was used to assess participants handedness (Oldfield, 1971). Three 
people were classified as left handed (EHI < -40), 24 ambidextrous (-40< EHI<40) and 
61 people were right handed (EHI > 40). All participants reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. The approval was obtained from the local research ethics committee 
(Reference 271016/MM/216). 
4.3.1.2 Task  
The same task in Chapter 4.2.1 (Experiment 4) was used. For more details please see 
(4.2.2.2). 
4.3.1.3 Study Design  
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Participants were randomly assigned to two different conditions: binary feedback 
condition and spatial feedback condition. Each participant in each condition used first 
their preferred hand in the first block, then used their non-preferred hand in the second 
block, or vice versa. The order in which participants completed the task was 
counterbalanced across subjects.  
4.3.1.4 Statistical Analyses 
4.3.1.4.1 Primary Analyses 
The post-survey questions were taken once after each experimental session. The same 
analyses described as in Chapter 4.2.1 (Experiment 4) was used here.  
4.3.1.4.2 Risk propensity Analyses 
To investigate riskiness behaviour throughout the experiment, a 2 (feedback: Spatial vs.  
Binary) X 2 (Used hand: Preferred hand vs Non-preferred hand) X 2 (Order; Preferred 
hand first, Non-preferred hand first) mixed design ANOVA was conducted. Bonferroni 
correction was used for pairwise t test post-hoc. The generalized Eta-Squared measure of 
effect size is reported. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was used to indicate if the assumption 
of sphericity had been violated for repeated measure ANOVAs. Levene’s test was used 
to assess for homogeneity of variance.    
4.3.1.4.3 Error Correction Analyses 
The same approach as in Experiment 4was adopted.  
4.3.1.4.4 Switch Selection Behaviour Analyses. 
The same approach as in Experiment 4 was adopted.  
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4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Preliminary 
Participants’ age in the binary feedback condition (M=19.71, SD=2.57) and participants’ 
age in the Spatial condition (M=20.32, SD=3.90); was compared and the result showed 
that there was no significant difference between two conditions (t(74.44)=-0.867, p = 
0.389). 
 
Subjective risk and subjective control scores were compared by using an independent t 
test. The assumption of normality for spatial feedback condition subjective risk scores 
(W=0. 932, p = 0.013) and for binary subjective risk scores (W= 0.935, p = 0.018) were 
violated. The binary and spatial feedback condition subjective risk scores were not 
normally distributed. There was no significant difference between the variances of the 
two sets of data [F(42,43)= 0.976, p = 0.939]. There was no significant differences in 
subjective risk (M = 4.07, SD= 1.83, SE= 0.28 for binary; M = 3.91, SD= 1.85, SE= 0.28 
for spatial) between two conditions (t(85) = 0.407, p = 0.685).  
 
The assumption of normality for both spatial feedback condition subjective control scores 
(W= 0.931, p = 0.011) and binary subjective control scores (W= 0.94, p = 0.027) were 
violated. The spatial and binary feedback conditions subjective control scores were not 
normally distributed. There was no significant difference between the variances of the 
two sets of data [F(42,43)= 1.095, p = 0.767]. The independent t test results showed that 
there was no reliable differences in subjective control (M = 3.79, SD= 1.78, SE= 0.27 for 
binary; M = 3.89, SD= 1.70, SE= 0.26 for spatial) between the two conditions (t(85) = -
0.256, p = 0.798). 
 
116 
 
 
Since parametric tests assume normality assumptions have been violated, a non-
parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test was also conducted for subjective control 
scores between the two conditions. The results showed no reliable difference (W = 917. 
p = 0.806). Subjective risk scores between two conditions also showed no reliable 
differences (W = 990.5. p = 0.705). 
 
Figure 4.8 Responses from post questionnaire for each feedback type.A) Participants 
rated if they felt in control of the outcome of the task. There was no significant difference between 
each condition regarding subjective control as expected. B) Participant rated how risky they think 
they are in each session. The subjective perception of their own selection is also aligned with the 
subjective control ratings. There was no significant difference between each condition regarding 
subjective riskiness. The data point shows the individual responds and the black circle represents 
the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
To sum up, participants’ age was not significantly different between conditions. The 
subjective control results indicated that participants in both conditions felt control to 
similar degrees (Figure 4.8A). The subjective riskiness results indicated that both 
conditions were risk seekers to a similar degree (Figure 4.8B).  
4.3.2.2 Primary Analyses 
4.3.2.2.1 Riskiness  
A 2(Feedback type: Spatial vs. Binary) X 2(Used hand: Preferred hand vs. Non-preferred 
hand) X 2 (Hand switch: Preferred hand first vs. Non-preferred hand first) ANOVA was 
conducted. There was a main effect of feedback [F(1,83)= 4.145, p = 0.045, η𝐺
2   = 0.037], 
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(Figure 4.9A&B). In addition, there was a marginal interaction between used hand and 
feedback [F(1,83)= 3.516, p = 0.064, η𝐺
2   = 0.009] (Figure 4.10); however, there was no 
other significant result. The Binary condition (M = 0.63, SD = 0.26, SE = 0.04) showed 
higher risk seeking behaviour than the Spatial condition (M = 0.52, SD = 0.28, SE = 0.04) 
(Figure 4.9C). 
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Figure 4.9 Risk propensity and hit performance according to feedback type and 
hand. Binary (Red) or Spatial (blue) feedback group for individuals using their Preferred 
(orange) or Non-Preferred (green) hands. A) Participants in the Binary feedback condition 
selected targets with smaller probabilities (smaller target size) than participants in the Spatial 
feedback condition. B) Participants actual hit performance. Participants in the Binary feedback 
are lower actual feedback. C) Participants in the Binary condition are more likely to be risk 
seekers. D) Participants may appear to be more risk seeking when using their non-preferred hand; 
however, there were no statistically reliable differences between hands observed. The data point 
shows the individual means and the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars 
represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 4.10 The interaction between Order and Feedback. The red and blue lines 
represents binary and spatial feedback respectively. The participants who used their non-preferred 
hand first are more risk seeker in the Binary feedback condition than the participants in the Spatial 
feedback condition. However, after switching hand the participants in the Spatial feedback 
condition became as much risk seekers as participants in the Binary feedback condition. 
Nevertheless, this interaction is only marginally significantly different. Light coloured ribbons 
represents the standard error. 
 
Lastly, same analysis was run on data from the participants whose handedness were 
measured 100 Edinburgh Handeness Inventory (EHI) (see Appendix 1).  
4.3.2.2.2 Error Correction  
To investigate motor performance, we looked at the degree of error correction participants 
displayed following each trial per condition. The linear models from two conditions are 
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represented in Table 7. The linear model for binary feedback showed a small value for 
slope suggesting that the model is skewed from the idealised error correction model. On 
the other hand, the linear model for spatial feedback was very close to the ideal error 
correction model. The pairwise comparison between the two models showed that these 
two models were significantly different from each other (t(8271)= 36.485, p<.0001) 
(Figure 4.11). 
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Figure 4.11 Error Correction Rates per Condition. On the x axis, the value of last seen 
spatial error (mm). On the y axis, the differences between their last seen spatial error value and 
their current spatial error value (mm). An ideal observer who would correct the error accordingly 
has been shown as dotted line in the graphs. In the graph participants purple line in the Spatial 
feedback condition shows that the linear model of participants’ correction approaches the ideal 
error correction. However, the linear model in the Binary feedback condition does not present a 
well-adjusted error correction. The correction in the binary feedback condition should be intrinsic 
error correction based on the knowledge of result, whereas, participants in the Spatial condition 
actually see the spatial feedback in every trial.  
 
To investigate the differences between non-preferred hand and preferred hand, the binary 
and spatial feedback conditions were examined separately. In the spatial feedback 
condition, the models of preferred hand and non-preferred hand showed that they were 
not significantly different from each other (t(4400)= 1.794, p=0.073). In the binary 
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feedback condition, the models of preferred hand and non-preferred hand models showed 
that these two models were not significantly different from each other (t(3867) = 1.307, 
p=0.191). 
Table 7  The results of fitted linear model for each condition. NPH = Non-preferred hand 
sessions and PH = preferred hand sessions. 
 
4.3.2.2.3 Switch Selection Behaviour 
To investigate switching behaviour, a 2 (Feedback type: Spatial vs. Binary) X 2 
(Outcome: Miss vs. Hit) X 2 (Previous Choice: Risky vs. Safe) ANOVA was conducted. 
There was a significant difference of feedback and outcome interaction [F(1,84)= 5.030, 
p = 0.027, η𝐺
2   = 0.003] (Figure 4.12C&D), as well as feedback and previous selection 
interaction [F(1,84)= 4.644, p = 0.034, η𝐺
2   = 0.03] (Figure 4.12A&B). (see Table 8 for 
mean values) 
 
 
 
Feedback 
type 
 ß df 
Lower confidence 
level interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary 
NPH -0.128 3867 -0.149 -0.106 
PH -0.149 3867 -0.173 -0.125 
Spatial 
NPH -0.859 4400 -0.913 -0.805 
PH -0.929 4400 -0.983 -0.875 
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Table 8 Values of mean, standard deviation and standard error. 
 
 
 
 
 Mean sd se 
Previous selection (Safe) 0.31 0.24 0.02 
Previous Selection (Risky) 0.27 0.27 0.02 
Hit 0.28 0.26 0.02 
Miss 0.30 0.25 0.02 
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Figure 4.12 Switch rate of participants based on the previous selection. When the 
previous selection is risky, participants in the Spatial feedback condition were more likely to 
switch compared to the participants in the Binary feedback condition. However, when the 
previous selection is safe, the participants in the Binary feedback condition are more likely to 
switch compared to Spatial condition. Participants in the Binary feedback condition switch more 
after a safe previous selection than risky selection. These graphs might confirm that participants 
in the Binary feedback condition were more likely to be risk seekers than participants in the 
Spatial condition (A&B). (C) Participants in the Spatial feedback condition were more likely to 
switch after a miss than participants in the Binary feedback condition. (D) Participants in the 
Binary and spatial feedback condition have a similar switch rate after a hit. The data point shows 
the individual means and the black circle represents the group mean. The error bars represent +/- 
1 standard error of the mean.  
 
4.3.3 In summary, participants in the Binary condition showed 
significantly more risky behaviour than participants in the Spatial 
condition. Using the non-preferred hand had a marginal effect on risk 
propensity of the participant in the spatial feedback condition when using 
the preferred hand later on. Binary feedback led to less accurate data 
correction than spatial feedback.  Discussion 
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The main findings from Experiment 4 suggested that providing only binary feedback (hit 
or miss) to participants using their non-preferred hand led them to increase their risk 
seeking behaviour, when compared to those who were provided with more detailed 
knowledge of their performance. To confirm whether there is a transfer effect of motor 
competence from one hand to another on choice behaviour we performed a second 
experiment employing a within subjects design. The results showed that providing binary 
feedback led to an increase in risk seeking behaviour, and this was the case irrespective 
of whether the preferred or non-preferred hand was used. 
 
This finding, that only receiving knowledge of the result leads to an increase in risk 
seeking when compared to those who receive knowledge of their performance, may 
appear contradictory to both the result of the previous chapter and current literature 
(McDougle et al., 2016). In general, whilst using the preferred hand visual external 
feedback is most advantageous, and whilst using the non-preferred hand proprioceptive 
feedback might be more advantageous (Renault, 2018; Sainburg & Kalakanis, 2017); 
however, some previous motor control studies have shown that both the preferred and the 
non-preferred hand can benefit from receiving different kinds of feedback (Duff & 
Sainburg, 2007; Renault, 2018; Sainburg & Kalakanis, 2017). Since being provided only 
with knowledge of the result does not confer any visual external feedback on their 
performance, participants who received binary feedback might have to rely only on 
proprioceptive feedback. Relying on proprioceptive feedback might have resulted in the 
increase in risk seeking behaviour observed whilst using their non-preferred hand for 
those in the Binary condition. 
 
126 
 
 
The sample studied in the current study was unusual compared to the general population: 
heavily ambidextrous (28%) compared to 1 % (Rodriguez et al., 2010) or 5% (Rigal, 
1992) of the general population that is classified as ambidextrous. However, some 
research on handedness suggest that ambidexterity in populations is greater than has been 
reported; instead there might be a shift to be right handed because of social pressure 
(Annett, 1998). Handedness has been described as on a spectrum with strong left and 
strong right hand on either ends (Annett, 1970). For example, people who are left handed, 
might prefer to write with their right hand. In fact ambidexterity in population is suggested 
to be 30% of the population (Annett, 1967). To be able to measure handedness in the 
current study, Edinburgh Handedness Inventory was used (EHI) which measures 
handedness on a spectrum (Annett, 1998; Oldfield, 1971). In the current study the 
handedness degree on EHI varied from -70 to 100. It may be that those who are able to 
use both their hands respond differently when using their preferred and non-preferred 
hand. As such, this may have had an effect on their risk propensity, and the high number 
of ambidextrous participants in this study may have somewhat contaminated the results 
observed. 
 
The effect of feedback whilst performing a motor task, whilst using the preferred and 
non-preferred hand, on the participants risk propensity is still an understudied area of 
research. Indeed, the lack of a complete explanation for the findings of this study 
indicated that further investigation was required. In Chapter 5, this was provided through 
the design of a new study, where the feedback the participants received switched from 
knowledge of performance to knowledge of result (or vice versa) whilst they used both 
their preferred and non-preferred hand for the motor control task.  
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Chapter 5 : The Combined Impact of Outcome Information and 
Competency on Sensorimotor Risk Taking  
5.1 Abstract 
The previous chapters have demonstrated that the format in which feedback is presented 
(binary vs spatial end point information) can have a substantial impact on an individual’s 
risk propensity in a decision-making task with large sensorimotor demands: The more 
information (i.e. spatial) one is provided about their motor execution, the less risk 
aversion they exhibit. The previous experiments have also shown motor competency 
(with preferred and non-preferred hand used as analogues of competency) in action 
execution modulates choice selection. In this experiment, the combined effect of these 
phenomena is examined by asking whether information modality and motor competency 
can have an additive impact on risk propensity. To this end, participants performed a 
decision-making task involving judgements about the ability to intercept selected targets 
for reward. A mixed groups design was employed with participants using their preferred 
or non-preferred hand (independent groups) performing an interceptive timing task with 
both spatial and binary feedback (order counterbalanced between participants). The 
results demonstrate that, for both groups (irrespective of hand) the participants who 
received binary feedback first, became more risk seeking when they receive spatial 
feedback; however, participants who received spatial feedback first kept more or less the 
same degree of risk seeking behaviour even whenthey received binary feedback in the 
second half. Also consistently, spatial feedback resulted in better error correction than 
binary feedback. These results are consistent with the idea that the accumulation of 
information about one’s own motor performance is a key determinant for subsequent 
risky choice behaviour.  
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5.2 Introduction 
Results from the previously reported experiments in this thesis have indicated that the 
amount of risk propensity exhibited by an individual in sensorimotor decision making 
may vary according to: (i) the degree of information available to the agent about their 
performances (operationalised through manipulating end-point feedback; spatial vs 
binary outcomes); and (ii) the sensorimotor competency to effectively carry out the action 
(operationalised by asking participants to complete the task with their preferred or non-
preferred hand).  
 
These results indicate that the factors modulating action evaluation and action execution 
both impact on choice selection. However, the results also raise a number of outstanding 
questions about how these parameters interact over time to feed into choice selection. For 
example, once information about their actions is provided to an agent through spatial 
feedback, does the impact of this diminish through subsequent presentations of binary 
feedback? In other words, do we see a decay effect of information on choice selection?  
 
Evidence from research on sensorimotor control indicates that people seem to adopt 
strategies to maximize the expected gain, by combining prior information and the noisy 
sensory input (Körding & Wolpert, 2004; Trommershäuser et al., 2008; Vaziri, 
Diedrichsen, & Shadmehr, 2006). As conceptualised by Bayesian decision making 
theory, the amount and degree of prior information one brings to the table in a decision 
making task is important in determining the posterior (Edwards et al., 1963; van de 
Schoot, Winter, Ryan, Zondervan-Zwijnenburg, & Depaoli, 2017). Indeed, empirical 
demonstrations have shown that even with the same observations, different priors can 
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lead to different posterior (Edwards et al., 1963; Vilares, Howard, Fernandes, Gottfried, 
& Kording, 2012) and thus bias choice selection.  
 
Therefore, receiving different feedback (spatial and binary), even with the same task 
outcome, might generate qualitatively different internal models and accumulate different 
quantities of evidence due to the precision of information available for each feedback 
presentation mode. Information quantity could account for the results seen in the previous 
chapters- participants who have available, and can accumulate, more information are able 
to exploit (choose riskier options) in comparison to scenarios where information quality 
is degraded. In this way, we would expect that participants who receive binary feedback 
and then spatial feedback will be able to exploit more in the second condition (thus 
replicating a previously observed pattern of results). But we also expect participants 
exposed to spatial feedback first to maintain their level of risk appetite in the Binary 
condition as they should have built up a sufficiently accurate model of the task to be able 
to continue to exploit in this impoverished feedback condition.  
 
In the previous chapter, the findings suggested that people performing a task with their 
non-preferred hand seemed to adopt different risk-taking strategies when compared with 
those performing with their preferred hand. The proposed explanation posits that using 
the non-preferred hand might manipulate the motor competence of the participants, which 
might change their risk propensity when performing a motor task (McDougle et al., 2016). 
More motor competence might cause riskier decisions. The reason why this occurs might 
be that the motor noise derived from the action would be higher while performing with 
the non-preferred hand compared with preferred hand (Annett et al., 1979), which is 
related to the controlling signal for an action (Todorov, 2005). Therefore, motor 
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competence might be an important variable to investigate. The assumption, that using the 
non-preferred hand would generate more motor noise leaves us to expect that these 
participants would be more risk averse.  
 
In terms of feedback type, literature suggests that while performing tasks with the non-
preferred hand, people seem to take advantage of different information from feedback. 
For example, proprioceptive feedback seems to be more advantageous for using the non-
preferred hand; whereas, visual feedback seems to be more advantageous for using the 
preferred hand (Bagesteiro & Sainburg, 2003; Sainburg, 2002; Sainburg & Kalakanis, 
2017) on a sample of deafferented individuals (Renault, 2018).  In the present task, 
participants receiving spatial feedback should have both proprioceptive as well as visual 
feedback; whereas, participants in the Binary condition would not have the visual 
feedback. Thus, we predict that that receiving more information would generate more 
risk-seeking behaviour, whilst performing a motor task with the non-preferred hand. This 
would be where participants performing with spatial feedback first might have a higher 
level of risk propensity when compared with those receiving binary first; and that after 
spatial feedback the equivalent level of risk propensity would be maintained in the binary 
feedback condition.  Similarly, participants receiving binary feedback first would receive 
less information than those in the Spatial feedback.  So, another prediction would be that 
a shift from binary to spatial feedback would lead to less risk seeking behaviour and a 
gradual increase in risk taking while subsequently receiving spatial feedback. 
 
Having defined the potential of information to impact on choice selection, let’s consider 
how this feedback might also impact on participants abilities to correct errors.  Receiving 
information on how to correct an error is more effective than just being informed of an 
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error (Kernodle & Carlton, 1992). The details of performance were externally available 
for those receiving spatial feedback. Since the error was not explicitly given in the binary 
feedback, participants might depend on their own sensory perceptual information, that 
was accessible as a consequences of movement being acted (van Vliet & Wulf, 2006). 
Therefore, the binary feedback might result in participants depending on just intrinsic 
feedback while correcting their error. Hence, any correction would be the result of 
proprioceptive information. Since the spatial feedback has more information, it should 
result in more effective error correction strategies. 
 
The current study aims to address these issues by investigating the combined effect of 
information via feedback and motor competence on risk propensity. The hypotheses are 
that: (i) participants performing with their non-preferred hand will be less risk-seeking 
than those performing with preferred hand; (ii) that the order of feedback presentation 
will have an effect on risk seeking, whereby participants who receive spatial feedback 
first will exhibit greater risk seeking (in both Spatial and Binary conditions) than those 
who received binary feedback first; and (iii) that the spatial feedback condition will 
exhibit better error correction, than those receiving binary feedback.  
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5.3 Experiment 6 
5.3.1 Sample 
A total of 124 participants were recruited to take part in this experiment from the 
University of Leeds School of Dentistry. Sixty-two people (aged 17-31 years; M: 18.68, 
SD: 2.62; 35 Female) were asked to perform the task with their preferred hand and 62 
people (aged 17-31 years; M:19.41, SD: 2.44, 38 Female) performed the task with their 
non-preferred hand. The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) was used to assess 
handedness (Oldfield, 1971). One person was classified as left handed (EHI < -40), 23 
ambidextrous (-40< EHI<40) and 38 people were right handed (EHI > 40) in the group 
where participants performed with preferred hand and 3 people were classified as left 
handed (EHI < -40), 21 ambidextrous (-40< EHI<40) and 37 people were right handed 
(EHI > 40) in the group where participants performed with the non-preferred hand. All 
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This was an opportunity 
sample, with participants taking part in the study during their visit on a School of 
Dentistry application day. Ethical approval was obtained from the local research ethics 
committee (Reference 271016/MM/216). It is important to note here there are a large 
amount of ambidextrous participants in the sample (35%) compared to general population 
(1%) (Rodriguez et al., 2010), which might impact on our motor competence 
manipulation.  
5.3.2 Task 
The interceptive timing decision making task has been described in previous chapters in 
detail and for brevity, only the elements relevant to the experimental manipulations are 
described here (Figure 2.1). In short, participants were asked to select between two targets 
of varying size which would they subsequently attempt to intercept, or “hit”, as the target 
moved across the screen. Selecting and successfully hitting smaller targets yielded more 
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reward than selecting and successfully hitting larger targets. Participants did not receive 
any reward for missing the selected target. 
 
Participants were exposed to two different types of outcome feedback associated with 
their interceptions- as in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. In the “binary” feedback condition, 
participants were informed only whether they hit or miss the target at the end of a 
movement towards the target without any other visual clue about their performance. In 
the “spatial” condition, participants could see both the end point of the reach and its 
relationship to the target. All participants were exposed to both feedback conditions, but 
the order was altered depending on the condition they were assigned to.  
5.3.2.1 Reward Schedule 
The reward schedule adopted here has been described in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Feedback 
was predetermined based on the same principles. (Figure 3.7). In brief, the hit probability 
and reward functions were manipulated accordingly target size for each target, such that 
the expected value was matched in every trial and kept constant throughout the 
experiment.  Risk was operationally defined based on the probability of hitting the target. 
The low probability of hitting the target was less likely to hit, therefore, it was accepted 
as risky target. The target with less probability of hitting than the other is the risky target 
because it was less likely to be achieved compared to the other target. The participant 
received the associated reward value on hit trials, whereas, no points were rewarded on 
the miss trials. Target location was counterbalanced. Target pairs were randomly 
displayed based on same reward schedule for all participants.  
5.3.2.2 Subjective Measures 
Participants were asked to complete a post-experiment survey at the end of the 
experimental session. The survey (using a 7-point Likert scale; where 1 is totally disagree 
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and 7 is totally agree) required participants to answer how much they agree with the 
following three statements: (i) “I felt in control of the outcome of the task”; (ii) “I was 
risk-seeking during the task”; and (iii) “The game tracked my movements accurately.”  
5.3.3 Study Design 
Previously, the manipulation of using preferred or non-preferred hand resulted in an effect 
on choice behaviour. In the current study, this manipulation was applied between subjects 
to avoid transferring the effect in a within subject design. Participants either used their 
preferred hand or non-preferred hand (two independent groups). All participants received 
spatial and binary feedback across the experiment, but the order of this feedback was 
counterbalanced across participants: the Spatial First group was given spatial feedback in 
the first block (50 trials), followed by binary feedback in the second/last block (50 trials); 
the Binary First group received Binary feedback first and then Spatial feedback. All 
participants completed 100 trials in total. 
5.3.4 Statistical Analysis 
5.3.4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
To ensure that there were no systematic age biases that could impact on the results, the 
age differences for the two independent groups (preferred hand and non-preferred hand) 
was tested via a t-test. Participant responses from the post-experiment survey, designed 
to examine subjective measures of riskiness and control were compared using a t-test; or 
non-parametric 2- group Mann-Whitney U Test if the assumptions of parametric tests 
were violated. The equality of variance was tested and assumptions of normality were 
examined by using a Shapiro-Wilk Normality test.  
5.3.4.2 Risk Propensity Analyses 
To investigate riskiness behaviour throughout the experiment, a 2 (feedback; spatial, 
binary) by 2 (order; Binary first, Spatial first) by 2 (hand; preferred hand, non-preferred 
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hand) mixed ANOVA was computed. The Levene’s test was used to assess for 
homogeneity of variance. The ezANOVA package in R was used to perform this analysis. 
Bonferroni correction was used for pairwise t test for post-hoc. The generalized Eta-
Squared (η𝐺
2 ) measure of effect size (Bakeman, 2005) is reported here. Mauchly’s Test 
of Sphericity was used to indicate if the assumption of sphericity had been violated for 
repeated measure ANOVAs.  
To visualise choice selection over time, risk propensity scores were calculated through 
moving averages with a step-size of 10 trials, where the scores were lagged by 10 trials. 
As with the global risk propensity measure, a safe choice was attributed a score of 0 and 
a risky choice was attributed a score of 1. Therefore, higher scores indicate highly risky 
behaviour, scores of 0 indicate highly risk averse behaviour and 0.5 indicates a risk 
neutral profile. These scores for individuals were averaged across participants to produce 
an average measure of risk across the trials.  
5.3.4.3 Error Correction 
As described in previous chapters, error correction was calculated by subtracting the last 
shown spatial error from the spatial error in the given trial for both spatial and binary 
feedback. Linear models were fitted to the data (with better fits indicating more error 
correction) and compared across conditions.  
5.3.4.4 Switch Selection Behaviour Analyses 
Switching behaviour as described in previous chapters was considered as switching target 
from safe to risky or risky to safe based on the outcomes (miss and hit) and feedback type 
(spatial and binary).  
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Preliminary analyses 
There was no difference in the ages of participants in our two groups (t(122.64) = 1.61, p 
= 0.111). An independent t test also showed that there were no significant differences 
between two groups in measures of control (M = 3.71, SD= 1.73, SE= 0.22 for preffered 
hand; M = 3.94, SD= 1.55, SE= 0.20 for non-preferred hand), as captured by the post-
experiment survey (t(124) = 0.759, p = 0.449; W= 1831, p =0.448). Similarly, there was 
no significant difference between two groups (t(124) = 1.121, p = 0.264; W = 1806, p = 
0.377) in their subjective measures of riskiness (M = 3.67, SD= 1.51, SE= 0.19 for 
preffered hand; M = 3.98, SD= 1.66, SE= 0.21 for non-preferred hand) on the task. 
5.4.2 Primary Analyses 
5.4.2.1 Risk Propensity 
A 2(feedback type; spatial, binary) X 2(used hand; preferred hand, non-preferred hand) 
X 2 (order; spatial first, binary first) ANOVA was conducted. There was a main effect of 
feedback [F(1,122)= 7.763, p = 0.006, η𝐺
2   = 0.017], with higher rates of riskiness in the 
spatial feedback condition (M=0.63, SD=0.32, SE=0.03) relative to the binary feedback 
condition (M=0.55, SD=0.31, SE=0.03; p = 0.045).  
 
In addition to this main effect, there was an Order x Feedback interaction [F(1,122)= 
6.012, p = 0.016, η𝐺
2   = 0.013] (Figure 5.1) and we also observed a Hand X order 
interaction  [F(1,122)= 6.184, p = 0.014, η𝐺
2   = 0.035] (Figure 5.2). Participants who 
received binary feedback first were more likely (p=0.009) to be riskier in the Spatial 
feedback (M=0.63, SD=0.34, SE=0.04) than in the binary feedback (M=0.48, SD=0.29, 
SE=0.04). In contrast, when participants received spatial feedback first, there was no 
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difference (p=0.86) in riskiness in the spatial (M=0.62, SD=0.29, SE=0.04) and binary 
feedback conditions (M=0.61, SD=0.31, SE=0.04).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Riskiness as a function of Feedback and Task Order. Participants who 
received binary feedback first became more risk seeking in the second phase of the 
experiment when spatial feedback was provided. However, when participants received 
spatial feedback, risk propensity remained consistent across the experiment. The lines 
show the group mean of moving average and the shaded areas indicate (+) and (-) standard 
error.  
 
Important for our experiment manipulation, we found that there was no difference 
(p=0.22) in riskiness for completing the task with the preferred hand (M=0.60, SD=0.27, 
SE=0.05) and non-preferred hand (M=0.52, SD=0.27, SE=0.05) when participants 
received binary feedback first. However, when participants completed the task with 
spatial feedback first with their preferred hand (M=0.69, SD=0.22, SE=0.04), there were 
significantly more risky (p=0.02) than when they were exposed to binary feedback 
(M=0.54, SD=0.28, SE=0.05), thus conceptually replicating the results reported in 
previous chapters showing feedback modulates risk taking.  
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Figure 5.2 Riskiness as a function of Hand and Task Order. Participants performing 
with the non-preferred hand were more risk-seeking than participants performing with the 
preferred hand when they both received binary feedback first. Interestingly, this pattern was 
reversed when participants received spatial feedback first. The lines were generated by using 
riskiness mean of moving average and the shaded regions indicate standard error. 
 
Lastly, same analysis was run on data from participants whose handedness were measured 
100 Edinbrugh Handeness Inventory (EHI) (see Appendix 2).  
5.4.2.2 Error Correction 
The fitted linear models from data points of two groups are represented in the Figure 5.3. 
The models were compared within groups (see parameters in Table 9).  
The linear model for the binary feedback condition showed a small value for the slope 
suggesting that the model is skewed from the idealised error correction model. In contrast, 
the linear model for spatial feedback was very close to the ideal error correction model. 
The pairwise comparison between two models showed that these two models were 
significantly different (t(5861)= 15.788, p<.0001). The same pattern was found in the 
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Spatial first group (t(5903)= 14.841, p<.0001) where the spatial feedback resulted in more 
ideal error correction than the binary feedback. 
Table 9 The results of fitted linear model for each condition 
 
Order  
Feedback 
type 
ß df 
Lower confidence 
level interval 
Upper confidence 
level interval 
Binary First 
Binary -0.246 5861 -0.272 -0.221 
Spatial -0.669 5861 -0.715 -0.623 
Spatial First 
Binary -0.251 5905 -0.278 -0.223 
Spatial -0.652 5905 -0.697 -0.606 
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Figure 5.3 Error correction following feedback on the previous trial. On the x axis, the 
value of last seen spatial error (mm). On the y axis, the differences between their last seen spatial 
error value and their current spatial error value (mm). An ideal person who would correct the error 
accordingly has been shown as dotted lines in the graphs. In the graph participants purple line in 
the spatial feedback shows that the linear model of participants’ correction approaches the ideal 
error correction in the Spatial first and binary first group. However, the linear model in the binary 
feedback condition does not present a well-adjusted error correction for both groups. The point 
in the graph represents each data points. 
 
5.4.2.3 Switch Selection Behaviour 
Finally, we investigated whether people switched from risky options to safe option or vice 
versa in response to hits and misses at a trial level. A 2 (Feedback type: Spatial vs. Binary) 
X 2 (Outcome: Miss vs. Hit) X 2 (Previous Choice: Risky vs. Safe) ANOVA repeated 
measure design was conducted. There was a main effect of previous selection [F(1,125)= 
7.129, p = .008, η𝐺
2   = 0.018], with participants more likely to switch if the previous 
selection was safe (M = 0.37, SD = 0.34, SE = 0.01) compared to when the previous 
choice was risky (M = 0.28, SD = 0.30, SE = 0.01) (p<0.0001) (Figure 5.4B). There was 
also a main effect of feedback [F(1,125)= 8.883, p = .003, η𝐺
2   = 0.005]. Participants were 
more likely to switch in the binary feedback condition (M=0.35, SD=0.32, SE: 0.01) 
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relative to the spatial feedback condition (M=0.30, SD=0.32, SE: 0.01; p=0.022; Figure 
5.4A). 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Effect of feedback and previous selection on switch rate.  Every point 
represents a mean for a participant. The black points (solid blobs) are group means and lines 
represent standard error. Participants performing in the Binary feedback (light green) are more 
likely to switch their previous selection than performing in the Spatial feedback (dark green); 
participants are also more likely to switch their previous selection after safe selection (dark 
purple) than risky selection (light purple). 
 
We also observed an interaction between feedback type and previous selection [F(1,125)= 
5.09, p = .026, η𝐺
2   = 0.005].  Participants in the binary feedback condition showed an 
equivalent level (p=0.16) of switching behaviour after making a safe choice (M=0.37, 
SD=0.34, SE=0.02) and risky selection (M=0.33, SD=0.31, SE=0.02), whereas, 
participants in the Spatial feedback had an increased switch rate after making a safe 
selection (M=0.37, SD=0.34, SE=0.02) than a risky selection (M=0.24, SD=0.29, 
SE=0.02; p<0.0001) (Figure 5.5). Notably, there was no interaction for with Outcome (hit 
and miss) (p<0.395).  
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Figure 5.5 Switch Rates as a function of feedback and previous choice. Participants are 
more likely to switch their selection after a safe selection in both binary and spatial feedback. 
However, after a risky, choice participants are more likely to change in the Binary than spatial 
feedback. The points represents ever data points. The black points represent the group mean and 
black lines represent the standard error. 
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5.5 Discussion  
The present study sought to investigate whether choice selection (and specifically risk 
propensity) could be influenced by a change in the information provided in the feedback 
and the order in which the feedback was presented in high and low motor competency 
conditions. Predicated on previous experiments reported in this thesis and the literature, 
we predicted that (i) using the non-preferred hand to execute actions would result in less 
risk-seeking behaviour than using the preferred hand; and (ii) receiving spatial feedback 
first would heighten risk seeking behaviour relative to the Binary condition. We also 
sought to explore whether there would be an asymmetry due to the order of feedback was 
presented. 
Contrary to results reported in Chapter 4, our first hypothesis was not supported, but did 
reveal a nuanced relationship between competency and feedback. The impact of 
handedness was modulated by the order in which feedback was presented. Specifically, 
participants performing with their non-preferred hand adopted more risk-seeking 
behaviour when spatial feedback was received first; whereas, the participants performing 
with their preferred hand adopted more risk-seeking behaviour when binary feedback was 
received first. However, we note Experiment 4 in Chapter 4 found binary feedback 
resulted in more risky decisions than spatial feedback in both the preferred and non-
preferred hand.  
 
When examining the impact of feedback format, participants who received spatial 
feedback first had a higher riskiness score and maintained the high riskiness in the second 
phase when binary feedback was given. In other words, we found an asymmetrical impact 
of feedback on choice selection. Participants who received the spatial feedback first 
showed heightened risk seeking behaviour relative to the binary feedback group - a 
pattern that has been replicated several times throughout this thesis (Chapter 3.2 
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(Experiment 2), Chapter 3.3 (Experiment 3), Chapter 4.2 (Experiment 4)). However, what 
was most interesting in this experiment was the impact of information carry-over. 
Participants who experienced spatial feedback first maintained their level of riskiness 
even when they received binary feedback later in the experiment. In contrast, participants 
receiving binary feedback first showed relatively neutral behaviour on average in the 
binary feedback condition and then gradually became more risk seeking in the spatial 
feedback condition (as expected).  
 
It seems clear that there was an information carry-over effect in our group transitioning 
from spatial to binary. But why might this be the case? We proposed that amount of 
information received in the early phase of the experiment for this group may have 
modulated the internal model of the agent causing them to remain risk seeking for the rest 
of the trials. This shift from exploration to exploitation behaviour is often seen in multi-
trial decision-making tasks, where agents seek out information about the task parameters 
before they start exploiting the environment for reward (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; 
Mehlhorn et al., 2015; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012). 
Such an interpretation aligns extremely well with the data observed here – participants 
were able to exploit only because the environment (presentation of spatial feedback) they 
previously interacted with allowed them to accumulate sufficient information that they 
could utilise in an information impoverished environment (the binary feedback 
condition).  
 
We may also consider these results from the opposite end of the same spectrum- that of 
uncertainty.  
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Turning now to the experimental evidence on the effect of using preferred and non-
preferred hand, participants using their non-preferred hand were more risk-seeking than 
people using their preferred hand when both groups received the spatial feedback first; 
whereas, when both groups received binary feedback first, participants using preferred 
hand had equivalent risk propensity with participants using their non-preferred hand. The 
differences in these results may be the effect of motor competent derived from using non-
preferred hand on risk propensity. The literature suggests that non-preferred hand had 
more motor noise in the execution compared with preferred hand (Annett et al., 1979; 
Harris & Wolpert, 1998), which subsequently might mean that people are less competent 
while using non-preferred hand. McDougle et al. (2018) provided some evidence, in the 
study conducted on patients who have cerebellar degeneration, that less motor competent 
might moderate risk propensity where participants have bias towards risk-averse action 
selection compared to healthy sample (no-motor disease history). In the current study, it 
is important to note here that receiving an execution error (spatial feedback) resulted in 
more risk-seeking selections, when compared with receiving only success and failure 
feedback (binary feedback) in the current study, as was expected. Even considering the 
higher amount of motor noise whilst performing the task with the non-preferred hand 
(Annett et al., 1979; Harris & Wolpert, 1998), this might not have been a sufficient 
increase in motor noise to impact motor competence due to ambidexterity.  
  
Interestingly, for participants using their preferred hand, the risk propensity in the first 50 
trials for both the spatial and binary feedback seems to show a similar trend. However, 
after switching, the participants became riskier when then receiving spatial feedback 
(binary first condition) and maintained an equivalent risk propensity when then receiving 
binary feedback (spatial first condition). This highlights the importance of when the more 
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informative feedback was presented. Participants seemed to be more risk-seeking when 
they receive more informative feedback first. 
 
Conversely, participants using their non-preferred hand showed different risk propensity 
between spatial and binary feedback groups in the first 50 trials. In the first block, 
participants who received binary feedback first were almost risk neutral in in this 
condition; whereas, those who received spatial feedback first were risk seekers, as was 
expected. Then in the second block, the participants who switched from receiving binary 
feedback (binary to spatial) began to adopt more risk seeking strategies; whereas, those 
who switched to binary feedback (from spatial feedback) kept a similar level of risk 
seeking behaviour in the second block to their first block, which was high already. 
Although participants who received binary feedback then spatial feedback became more 
risk seeking during the spatial feedback regime, they are less risk seeking than those who 
received spatial feedback first. This difference is as was expected due to the difference in 
the feedback provided. Additionally, participants using their non-preferred hand showed 
relatively riskier behaviour in their second 50 trials, after switching feedback type, 
showing a different trend to the participants using their preferred hand. This difference 
may be due to the interaction between feedback type and which the hand is used. Binary 
feedback might be more beneficial for those using the non-preferred hand (Duff & 
Sainburg, 2007; Sainburg & Kalakanis, 2017). Interestingly, where participants 
performed with their non-preferred hand, changes in the information given in the 
feedback affected the risk propensity more or less in the same direction as for the 
preferred hand group.  
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There is one important limitation in the current study that is noteworthy. This sample 
included a large proportion of ambidextrous people (35%)- which is much larger than the 
general population (1%) (Rodriguez et al., 2010). We had an opportunity to recruit a large 
amount of participants from the School of Dentistry and the participants sampled may not 
be reflective of the general population. Dentistry is an ambidextrous profession (Arora & 
Saiya, 2018), requiring the skilled use of both hands and our sample, although not 
professional dentists, may already have had far more experience of using their non-
preferred hand than the general population (Kriz, Voola, & Yuksel, 2014).  
 
This may have impacted on the results in at least two different ways. The first possibility 
is that the manipulation of motor competence might have failed. There was no test 
conducted to check whether the manipulation of motor competence was achieved. For 
example, in retrospect, a post-experiment subjective report could have been implemented 
and participants might have been asked how competent they felt while using their 
preferred and non-preferred hand. The second limitation is that ambidextrous participants 
might have received different degrees of sensory information whilst performing the motor 
task (we had reasoned that the non-preferred hand would exhibit more internally 
generated motor noise, but this might not have been the case for ambidextrous people). 
This might have contaminated the results of the current study. Future work could explore 
this relationship in more detail.  
 
In summary, this experiment has shown that both feedback and competency can together 
impact on risk taking. The specific impact of these conditions seem to be modulated by 
the order in which participants experience the different feedback conditions. Participants 
who receive spatial feedback first have higher riskiness scores and maintained their higher 
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riskiness in the second phase, when compared with the participants who received binary 
feedback first. The participants who received binary feedback first, became gradually 
more risk seeking when spatial feedback was subsequently given. The competency of the 
hand used whilst performing the task was also a factor:  participants performing with their 
non-preferred hand adopted more risk-seeking behaviour when spatial feedback was 
received first; whereas, the participants performing with their preferred hand adopted 
more risk-seeking behaviour when binary feedback was received first. Together, these 
results indicate the importance of prior information received on future risk propensity and 
the effect of motor noise derived from using non-preferred hand on risk propensity. 
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Chapter 6 General Discussion 
6.1 Overview 
Research on decision-making has historically focussed on action selection, with intense 
examination of the processes that result in choosing one option out of a number of 
possibilities (Newell et al., 2015). This body of work has been heavily influenced, and 
has influenced, economic choice theory. In parallel, there has been a large body of work 
on the processes involved in sensorimotor execution- that is, the implementation of a 
chosen course of actions to interact with the world (Kording & Wolpert, 2004; Wolpert 
& Landy, 2012). This stream of work has, until recently, had very little to do with classic 
decision-making research and only in the last decade have researchers considered framing 
such behaviours as a form of decision-making (Trommershäuser et al., 2008; Wolpert & 
Landy, 2012). 
 
The lack of connection between research on action selection and execution is a rather 
surprising gap given that there can be no decision without execution. This gap is even 
more remarkable given recent seminal studies have showed a profound impact on choice 
selection when the contribution of the sensorimotor domain in action execution is 
manipulated (Green et al., 2010; Parvin et al., 2018). Predicated on these recent 
experiments and a growing perspective in psychological research in general that human 
cognition is far more embodied than traditional approaches have considered (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980), this thesis set out to examine the factors that impact on action selection 
and action execution in determining decision making.  
 
To address this research question, a novel decision-making task was created. The task 
was designed to examine how individuals maximised reward across different 
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experimental manipulations designed to probe the impact of selection and execution on 
decision making. A brief summary of the experimental results from these manipulations 
is presented below before we delve into more general conclusions that may be derived 
from this work.  
6.2 A Brief Review of the Experimental Findings 
The experimental work in this thesis started off by examining the effect of agency on risk 
taking and provided some evidence that being in control of the action execution phase 
(along with the order with which the feedback was presented) impacts on risk propensity. 
Being in control of execution in a novel environment, as soon as the task started, resulted 
in a risk-averse behaviour; whereas, being in control of the execution after not having 
control of the execution in the first two blocks resulted in more risk-seeking selection. 
Interestingly, this effect did not hold in a condition where there was no control or only 
partial control of the execution. Being able to be in control of the execution seemed to be 
an elegant way to manipulate the sense of agency; however, the literature suggested that 
positive feedback might be more effective at making people think that they are in control, 
rather than being actual in control (Wen et al., 2015). Nevertheless, executing an action 
and being in complete control seemed to influence risk propensity, when compared with 
none and partial control of the execution, regardless of the different feedback types.  
 
This work was followed by two experiments in Chapter 3 which examined if risk 
propensity could be modulated by the degree of information provided about execution 
error in a motor decision making task. To investigate this, two different feedback types 
were employed. These feedback types were classified based on the information they 
provided to the agent: knowledge of result and knowledge of performance. The feedback 
categorised as knowledge of performance (spatial feedback) included the information of 
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the motor execution error; how far the participants were to success. The feedback 
qualified as knowledge of result (binary feedback) had only one type of information, 
either failure or success. Importantly, spatial feedback has more information than binary 
feedback. The result provided evidence that participants receiving spatial feedback were 
more likely to be risk seeking than those receiving binary feedback; in addition, spatial 
feedback resulted in higher hit rates than binary feedback. To tackle the influence of 
differences in hit rate, the expected value needed to be constant for both binary and spatial 
feedback as in experiment 5. Interestingly, still participants who received spatial feedback 
still adopted more risk seeking strategies than those who received binary feedback. In 
both experiments the spatial feedback resulted in better error correction than binary 
feedback. 
 
Chapter 4 attempted to investigate the effect of motor competence on risk propensity 
through two experiments. The first study aimed to investigate how different types of 
feedback had an effect on risk propensity when motor competence was low. To this end, 
participants were asked to perform the task with their non-preferred hand. The previously 
used feedback manipulations were also employed in this study. Surprisingly, there was 
no significant difference in risk propensity between preferred and non-preferred hand. 
The analyses showed a significant effect of feedback type, where spatial resulted in more 
risk seeking behaviour.  In a second study we investigated if there would be an 
information transfer effect when switching from using the preferred hand to the non-
preferred hand and vice versa. Participants who used their non-preferred hand first were 
more risk seeking in the binary feedback condition than the participants in the Spatial 
feedback condition. However, after switching hand the participants in the Spatial 
feedback condition became as much risk seeking as the participants in the Binary 
feedback condition. Statistically this interaction was only marginally significant. The 
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literature suggests there might be differences in how the preferred hand and non-preferred 
hand might use different types of feedback effectively (Renault, 2018; Sainburg, 2002): 
visual feedback may be more advantageous for the preferred hand, and proprioceptive 
feedback might be more advantageous for the non-preferred hand and this may manifest 
in differences in choice selection. In both experiments spatial feedback resulted in better 
error correction than binary feedback. 
 
The final experimental chapter examined the effect of the prior information generated 
from different feedback types on risk propensity. The study provided some evidence that 
receiving spatial feedback first resulted in an equivalently high-risk seeking strategy in 
the subsequent binary feedback condition. However, receiving binary feedback first did 
not indicate a similar trend; instead, there was a gradual increase in risk seeking selections 
in the second block where the spatial feedback was given. Interestingly, the participants 
performing with their non-preferred hand selected more risky targets, in both spatial and 
binary feedback, when spatial feedback was given first. It should be noted however, that 
the sample in this study had far more ambidextrous people than the average population, 
which might have impacted on risk propensity in an unexpected way. Lastly the spatial 
feedback consistently has resulted in better error correction than binary feedback in all 
experiment it has been analysed. 
6.3 Common Themes and Implications 
Throughout this thesis, some patterns of results were replicated consistently across 
several experiments. For example, we found a very strong effect of feedback on risk 
seeking behaviour across most of the experiments in this thesis. Given that outcome 
feedback is an important source of information to help refine one’s actions to optimise 
behaviour for a task, it is not surprising to find that this had a profound effect on 
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participants risk propensity. A second common theme was the observation that 
participants often shifted towards a risk seeking state from their starting position, but that 
this was generally bounded by some ceiling level of riskiness. These results indicate that 
participants were performing explore- exploit trade-offs in their decision-making 
(Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Mehlhorn et al., 2015; Mulder et al., 2012; on exploration and 
exploitation here), accumulating evidence by exploring the task space and exploiting (i.e. 
selecting risky choices) once sufficient amount of information had been accumulated.  
 
The findings from this work also highlight a much broader point that is often neglected 
in choice selection research. Most economic choices involve one-shot decisions. Take for 
example the classic Asian disease problem (where participants are asked to imagine a 
hypothetical scenario in which they must choose between two options for a disease that 
would kill 600 people - one option could save 200 people while another would have a 1/3 
probability of saving all 600 people, but a two-thirds probability of saving no one) or the 
Ellsberg paradox described in the introductions. In these famous examples, there are no 
opportunities to learn from the consequences of one’s actions and refine one’s behaviour 
for subsequent trials. Instead, participants can only make use of the priors they bring into 
the task. Experiences of this type may be extremely limited and thus, the priors quite weak 
and uninformative (how many times has the average psychology participant had to make 
a life or death decision as in the Asian disease problem?) In contrast, in the motor learning 
world, tasks involve using extremely well refined actions (e.g. reaching towards a target), 
which have been honed over a lifetime of experience and require only calibration to the 
experimental setting.  
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These differences may also point towards reconciling differences between findings from 
decision making on cognitive and sensorimotor decision making. It is often said that the 
former is susceptible to numerous biases (Kahneman et al., 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) but the sensorimotor system is Bayes optimal. Could it be that this reflects 
snapshots of behaviour across very different timescales? This would be an interesting 
avenue to examine through running extended experiments capturing learning in the 
laboratory so that the cognitive tasks also become well honed. Alternatively, it may be 
instructive to look at the developmental trajectory of risk propensity in these tasks, 
reasoning that very young children should have less experience of interacting with the 
environment and thus less precise priors and thus optimality of the sensorimotor system 
may be compromised. 
6.4 Limitations and Future Work 
We must also consider some of the limitations of the present studies and the avenues that 
the present work presents for future research.  
 
We took an opportunistic approach to sampling participants for the majority of the studies 
reported in this thesis. Specifically, we had a unique opportunity to collect data from 
highly motivated students who presented at the university as part of an interview day for 
dental undergraduate degree. The remainder of participants were motivated through 
financial remuneration. Whilst studies have shown that providing financial incentives can 
have a substantial impact on the ways in which people process outcomes. However, it is 
plausible to assume that the sample selected for this study were even more motivated than 
those provided with financial remuneration. 
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A lab-based task was chosen over real-world and more ‘realistic’ task scenarios so that 
the component parts of decision-making could be easily separated and manipulated. It 
would be interesting to see the extent that the behavioural patterns observed here would 
carry over to different scenarios and more ecologically relevant contexts. Perhaps the 
most common behavioural strategy throughout the experiments in this thesis was 
heightened risk propensity when participants received information about their execution 
error. One explanation for this phenomenon (as explored in Chapter 2 in experimental 
manipulations on agency and proposed by McDougle et al., 2016; Parvin et al., 2018; 
McDougle et al., 2019) is that the heightened motor demands of this action induced a 
sense of control (c.f. pressing a button on a keypad) that manifested in this risk profile. 
However, it is worth considering that participants only performed a very simple motor 
action (swipe from the bottom of a tablet to the top on the tablet using a stylus). Naturally, 
even though swiping is a more “complex movement” than pressing a key (and it is a 
movement people apply in real-world while using technological gadget like smart phones 
and tablets), future tasks could examine even more “complex” real world movement, 
which could provide the context that enable us to do many different movements whilst 
demanding just one (Janemalm, Quennerstedt, & Barker, 2018). This movement might 
be converted into a real-life scenario, such as swinging a baseball or cricket bat.  
 
Given that the task properties used in most of the studies in the thesis were set to the 
equivalent expected value (~37 for each target) between trials in all experiments where 
hit rate was predetermined, replicating these studies with extremely high and extremely 
low expected values would be an interesting for future research. Changing the magnitude 
of the EV (and thus heightening [or lowering] the importance of a given choice) could 
have a profound effect on choice selection. For example, the decision of which job to take 
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(a high magnitude event) would likely cause different choice strategies than deciding 
what to cook for lunch (Botella, Narváez, Martínez-Molina, Rubio, & Santacreu, 2008).  
 
One interesting effect found in this thesis was that of motor competence on risk seeking 
behaviour. Experiments in Chapter 4 that studied motor competence failed to take motor 
competence measure into account; since, experiments which have studied motor 
competence have used pathological samples which do not require a measurement 
(McDougle et al., 2016). In retrospect, the experiment presented in Chapter 5 could have 
been improved to measure motor competence; however, the feasibility of applying a 
motor competence battery (Sigmundsson, Lorås, & Haga, 2016) was low due to the time 
constriction the participants had to perform the tasks. Given the limitations that were 
taken into consideration, the studies in Chapter 4 and 5 failed to eliminate the effect of 
confounding ambidexterity. For future studies, this might be an important point to 
consider. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Together, these studies demonstrate the importance of looking at the decision-making 
process as an interconnected whole- one that comprises action selection and action 
execution. This thesis has introduced a multi-stage multi-trial decision-making task that 
allows one to manipulate these elements in a controlled manner. Over a series of 
experimental investigations, we have demonstrated that information manipulation 
(through constraining actions and feedback and increasing sensorimotor noise) modulates 
the rate at which participants shift from a risk averse state to a risk seeking state. More 
generally, these experimental investigations have demonstrated the interplay between 
cognitive and sensorimotor systems in choice selection by illustrating the bilateral 
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relationship between parameters driving action selection and execution interact to 
manifest in decision-making.   
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APPENDIX A 
Supplementary Result For Experiment 5 
To investigate the effect of motor competence on decision making, experiment 5 was 
conducted. High motor competence was operationalised as using preferred hand and low 
motor competence was operationalised as using non-preferred hand. However, 
handedness of participants in experiment 5 was ranged between left with 60 EHI score 
and right hand with 100 EHI , some participants were classified as ambidextrious. This 
might change the effect of motor competence. Therefore, in these analyses participants 
only whose handedness were assessed as 100% right or left handed. There are 12 
participants (8 female) with 100% right hand Edinburgh handedness inventory score. 
Therefore this analyses was tested only on these participants. 
  A 2(feedback type; spatial, binary) X 2(order; preferred hand first, non-preferred hand 
first) X 2 (used hand; preferred hand, non-preferred hand) ANOVA was conducted. There 
were not main effects of feedback, order nor used hand. However, there was an interaction 
between  used hand and order [F(1,8)= 6.812, p = 0.031, η𝐺
2   = 0.023]. Pairwise 
comparisions indicated that there was a significant differences between order (p=0.000) 
whilist no significant differences in used hand (p=0.16). (see Table 10 for mean values).  
Table 10 Value of means, standard deviations and standard errors. 
 
Order Used Hand Mean sd se 
NPH First 
PH 0.77 0.42 0.02 
NPH 0.65 0.48 0.03 
PH First 
PH 0.55 0.50 0.03 
NPH 0.64 0.48 0.03 
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APPENDIX B 
Supplementary Result For Experiment 6 
Since participants using both hand might result in some unclearity on the result. Same 
analysis in the chapter was run on data from participants with 100 EHI score. There were 
16 participants (8 Female), 6 using non-preferred hand (left) and 10 using preferred hand 
while performing.  
 A 2(feedback type; spatial, binary) X 2(order; spatial first, binary first) X 2 (used hand; 
preferred hand, non-preferred hand) ANOVA was conducted. There were main effect of 
used hand [F(1,12)= 17.054, p = 0.001, η𝐺
2   = 0.384]. Pairwise comparisions indicated 
that there was a significant differences between participants using preferred hand (M = 
0.47, SD= 0.50, SE =0.02) and non-preferred hand (M= 0.85, SD= 0.36, SE= 0.01) 
(p=0.000). 
 
 
